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CHOOSING JUDGES THE DEMOCRATIC WAY
LARRY W. YACKLE*
A generation ago, the pressing question in constitutional law was the
countermajoritarian difficulty.' Americans insisted their government was a
democratic republic and took that to mean rule by a majority of elected
representatives in various offices and bodies, federal and local. Yet courts
whose members had not won election presumed to override the actions of
executive and legislative officers who had. The conventional answer to this
apparent paradox was the Constitution, which arguably owed its existence
to the people directly. Judicial review was justified, accordingly, when court
decisions were rooted firmly in the particular text, structure, or historical
backdrop of the Constitution. Courts' nonmajoritarian power was otherwise
unexplained and unexplainable. Today, we are smarter, if not wiser. We, or
most of us,' have abandoned false hopes that the Constitution can be
squared with majoritarianism and that appeals to literal text, inferences from
,structure, or "original intent" can offer neat answers to the countermajori-
tarian riddle.3 More important, we have rejected the notion that majorita-
* Professor of Law, Boston University. I would like to thank Kathryn Abrams,
Jack Beermann, Clark M. Byse, Michael J. Churgin, Stanley Z. Fisher, Ira C. Lupu,
Lawrence G. Sager, and Aviam Soifer for valuable comments on an earlier draft. I
also want to acknowledge help from the Faculty Workshop at Boston University.
James G. Newman and Suzanne S. Taylor helped with research.
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962) (arguing that judicial review is countermajoritarian in that it
constitutes "control by an unrepresentative minority of an elected majority").
2 But see Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 823, 824-26 (1986) (arguing that judges must interpret the Constitu-
tion's words according to the intentions of those who drafted, proposed, and ratified
it). The magnitude of Judge Robert Bork's departure from the main channel of
constitutional law scholarship, as well as the direction of that departure, may have
incited the controversy surrounding his nomination for a position on the Supreme
Court. See Boston Globe, Oct. 24, 1987, at 1, col. 3 (reporting Bork's 58-42 defeat on
the Senate floor); see also The Bork Nomination, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1987)
(collecting discussions of Judge Bork's record). I do not mean in this essay to build a
case for or against the Reagan Administration's ill-fated attempt to seat Judge Bork.
But I acknowledge that what I have to say may have implications for the manner in
which the Senate, and indeed the country, responded to his nomination.
3 No one contends, for example, that the president's authority to nominate and the
Senate's ability to veto candidates for the federal bench justify a judicial override of
executive and legislative decisions. Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights
Cases: A Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278, 329 (1979) (conceding that
the joint power of the president and Senate to make appointments to the Court does
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rianism is an unqualified good and now appreciate more fully the importance
of restraints on majoritarian power. The first check is republicanism, which
proves to be both a practical necessity in a populous nation and a device for
filtering individual and group preferences. 4 Raw majoritarianism, which
chooses policies by a barren show of hands, may sacrifice the interests of the
politically disadvantaged. By contrast, representative bodies can attend to
all citizens' interests-fashioning public policies to the common good. This
check is insufficient in operation, however. The representative process tends
to degenerate into a bewildering political marketplace dominated by factions
about which Madison warned the nation in her crib.' Effective political
accountability is owed primarily to the diligent, the organized, the histori-
cally dominant, and the well-heeled. 6
A further check on majoritarianism is therefore required-to be supplied
by judges enforcing the Constitution. By the sights of mainstream schol-
arship today, majority support alone is an insufficient basis for upholding
governmental action. Rather, the measure under examination must serve
some legitimate governmental objective-an objective which takes account,
not dissolve the tension between noninterpretive review and the principle of elector-
ally accountable policymaking). Nor is Congress's power over the judicial budget or
the possibility of impeachment sufficient to resolve the countermajoritarian dilemma.
J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 49-52 (1980).
Both Black and Perry have announced their reliance on Congress's power to restrict
the federal courts' jurisdiction as a means of resolving the countermajoritarian
tension. See C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW 17-19 (1981); M. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITI-
MACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 128-39 (1982). Yet
that explanation for judicial review is perhaps the most dissatisfying of all. Sager,
What's a Nice Court Like You Doing in a Democracy Like This?, 36 STAN. L. REV.
1087, 1101-05 (1984) (arguing that congressional power to regulate jurisdiction is
limited and that stripping the federal courts of power would undermine the legal
system). Bruce Ackerman tries to maintain fealty to majoritarianism by understand-
ing constitutionalism as the reflection of intertemporal conflicts in majoritarian pref-
erences. Courts, in his view, are justified in invalidating current legislative decisions
in order to vindicate prior majoritarian choices, made in periods of constitutional
politics, which rightly override policies fashioned on a daily basis. Ackerman, The
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1049-51 (1984).
See also Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571 (1988)
(attempting to justify judicial review as the enforcement of a constitutional "Ulysses
contract" by which a majority binds itself to "metapreferences" expressed earlier).
4 See infra Part III (discussing Sunstein's exploration of the republican character
of American government).
5 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
6 The point is overstated in the text, but I credit the implication, flowing from both
the pluralist and public choice literature, that there is wisdom in Bismarck's epigram:
If you like sausages and law, don't go where they're made. See infra notes 74 and 76
(citing pluralist and public choice literature).
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of the interests of all citizens. When the representative process falters, and
majorities reach results that disparage political losers out of hostility, courts
are empowered to call a halt. It may seem that judicial review is in this sense
consistent with majority rule and can be justified as a means of perfecting
majoritarian processes. 7 Yet in performing their constitutional function
courts do not enforce ideas that enjoy majority support; they insist upon
independent principle.' Judges call upon majorities to respect the integrity of
all citizens. That mandate needs no majoritarian endorsement and, indeed,
holds its own ground in the teeth of majoritarian sentiment. 9 This system-
contemplating ordinary policymaking by representative bodies subject to
judicial review to ensure that all citizens' interests are respected-earns a
splendid appellation: American constitutional democracy. The label fits, not
because the preferences of rank-and-file citizens are translated into public
policy by majoritarian means, and not because courts force elected officers
to adhere to majoritarian preferences, but because all Americans can safely
look both to their republican representatives and to their courts to ensure
that they are remembered in the councils of government.
The vital function assigned to courts in this constitutional democracy
demands that judges who staff those courts themselves be selected constitu-
tionally. This is the terrain I mean to explore. My point of departure is the
unremarkable proposition that the Constitution has something to say about
choosing both federal and state judges. Various provisions of the Constitu-
tion and its interpretive culture plainly bear upon judicial selection. Still,
constitutional standards are typically disclaimed in this context, and the
selection of judges is left to politics restrained only by vague conventions of
recent origin. 0 A principal part of my project, then, is to investigate our
palpable distrust of constitutional standards for the selection of judges.
Another is to identify those standards.
Part I meets the contention that the Constitution relegates judicial selec-
tion solely to politics. With respect to federal judges, the constitutional text
Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L.
REv. 451, 456-71 (1978).
1 Thus Ronald Dworkin has distinguished between claims that are acknowledged
because they are embraced by a majority and claims that rest upon individual rights
apart from majority preferences. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 376-77 (1986) [here-
inafter LAW'S EMPIRE]; accord R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-100
(1977).
9 This is Larry Sager's chief criticism of Ely. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution
10 (unpublished manuscript) (on file at the offices of the Boston University Law
Review) (contending that "[n]otions of liberty, equality, and fair dealing pervade our
constitutional tradition as core themes, not incidental diversions from a majoritarian
project").
10 I have in mind here recurring suggestions that the selection of judges should be
an exercise in antiseptic appraisal of candidates' "qualifications" apart from politics.
See infra Part IV(B).
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and fair inferences from it establish only that the president and the Senate
may pursue political objectives in naming candidates to the bench. The text
does not proclaim that politics supplies the sole basis of choice to the
exclusion of all else. Quite the contrary, the appointments clause only
structures the way in which both political concerns and independent con-
stitutional standards are brought to bear on judicial appointments. And with
regard to state judges, ordinary constitutional analysis, derived primarily
from the fourteenth amendment, is fully applicable to judicial selection just
as it is to other faces of state action. Part II examines the recurrent suspicion
that no manageable constitutional standards can be identified and anticipates
the contention that, were standards available, they would necessarily entail
choosing judges by popular election. Both concerns prove to be illusory.
Part III offers a severely truncated survey of current constitutional thinking
and distills from it principles that I later invoke to define constitutional
standards suitable for judicial selection.
Part IV, the body of the essay, identifies standards for choosing judges
and pursues the implications of invoking those standards. First, I contend
that in state regimes in which judges are elected, well-settled constitutional
standards for the conduct of elections are fully applicable and that in state
and federal systems in which judges are appointed, related standards, bor-
rowed from the law of "affirmative action," are equally applicable by
analogy. Put bluntly, the Constitution mandates that members of constitu-
tionally significant out-groups are included in the pool from which judges are
taken. Second, I identify judicial selection criteria typically mentioned in the
literature and consider in each instance whether the Constitution, properly
understood, permits decisionmakers to invoke those criteria in choosing
candidates to be elevated to the bench. In some instances, common under-
standings are perfectly consistent with the Constitution; in others, criteria
conventionally thought to be appropriate are constitutionally objectionable.
Finally, Part V discusses appropriate implementation machinery. I set to one
side the possibility that judicial selection standards may be enforced through
ordinary litigation in the courts and focus upon the duty of executive and
legislative authorities to respect constitutional standards governing their
participation in the judicial selection process.
I. JUDICIAL SELECTION AND PERMISSIBLE POLITICS
The first barrier to the recognition of constitutional standards applicable to
the selection of judges is the prevailing tendency to read the Constitution to
assign judicial selection to the political arena."1 Thus it is said that within the
" This is to invoke a cousin of the much-noticed but little-applied "political
question" doctrine, which has it that courts must keep their own counsel with respect
to constitutional issues demonstrably assigned by the Constitution to a coordinate
political department. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962); see also
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federal system the appointments clause leaves both the nomination of candi-
dates by the president and their acceptance by the Senate to the political
predilections of the elected officials concerned-in one of two mutually
exclusive ways. Either the selection of judges is a matter of executive
,prerogative such that the president's political judgment should prevail, in
which case the Senate's role is drastically limited," or the selection ofjudges
is thoroughly political in every sense, in which case both the president and
the Senate are free to pursue their own political agenda to the exclusion of
any and all other concerns. 13 By either account, invoking the Constitution
with respect to the appointment of judges renders no legal standards to guide
decisionmakers. While the Civil War amendments are plainly applicable to
the selection of state judges, it is widely believed that there too the forces
operating within a state's political framework will be paramount.14
The tools for these arguments in the federal system are familiar. The
appointments clause expressly refers only to "Judges of the supreme Court"
and as to them assigns to the president the authority to "nominate" candi-
Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 599-601
(1976). In the judicial selection context, the point is not that the Constitution assigns
the enforcement of standards to other branches but that the Constitution establishes
no standards at all-save the political preferences of office-holders elsewhere in the
government.
12 See, e.g., Humphrey, Plainly The Man for the Job, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1987,
at A17, col. 1 (insisting that because Ronald Reagan won the presidential election of
1984 he was entitled to name a person who shared his "conservative judicial
philosophy"-Judge Bork-to the Supreme Court). President Nixon's statement in
connection with the Carswell nomination may be the classic illustration of the
argument for presidential prerogative:
What is centrally at issue in this nomination is the constitutional responsibility
of the President to appoint members of the Court-and whether this responsibil-
ity can be frustrated by those (in the Senate) who wish to substitute their own
philosophy or their own subjective judgement for that of the one person en-
trusted by the Constitution with the power of appointment.
H. BALL, COURTS AND POLITICS: THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 183 (2d ed. 1987)
(quoting a letter from Richard Nixon to Senator William Saxbe, March 31, 1970).
Compare N. MCFEELEY, APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES: THE JOHNSON PRESIDENCY
138-39 (1987) (recalling that Lyndon Johnson named "Great Society liberals" to the
federal bench in order to shape the judiciary through his nominations) with Note, All
the President's Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts
of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 766 (1987) (reporting that President Reagan nomi-
nated only conservatives).
13 See L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT ix, 108, 111 (1985) (describ-
ing and defending political machinations on both sides of the appointment struggle).
14 See P. JOHNSON, THE COURT ON TRIAL: THE CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL ELECTION
OF 1986, at 2-5 (1985) (published by The Supreme Court Project and The Foundation
for Research in Economics and Education) (describing expectations that Republican
and Democratic governors in California would name different candidates to the state
bench and advocating that citizens take politics into account in retention elections).
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dates and to the Senate the responsibility to offer "Advice and Consent." 5
By common account, this division of labor reflects structural themes much in
evidence in the Convention debates.' 6 On one level, the appointments clause
incorporates "separation of powers" and "checks and balances." Gov-
ernmental power at the national level is distributed among three "separate"
branches-legislative, executive, and judicial-in order to prevent the
concentration of authority in any one. At the same time, the spheres of
influence occupied by the separate branches are not insular: each branch is
granted express authorities with respect to the business of the other two in
order to check their excesses." In this instance, the ability to place candi-
dates on the Supreme Court is shared by the president and the Senate in a
fashion that both recognizes the independent responsibilities of the execu-
tive and legislative branches and ensures that neither can upset the constitu-
tional equipoise by appropriating the Court.
On a second level, the reservation ofjudicial selection to the president and
the Senate, to the exclusion of the House of Representatives, reflects yet
another historical balance-between confederation and popular democracy.
Madison initially proposed that the Senate rather than the House or the full
Congress should appoint the justices of the Supreme Court.' 8 At that time,
he was apparently convinced that such appointments should be made by a
legislative unit but thought that the smaller body was better suited to identify
qualified candidates and less likely to choose justices on the basis of friend-
ship or talents for legislative, rather than judicial, service.' 9 By the time a
version of his scheme was adopted, however, the Convention had agreed
that the Senate's membership would be apportioned by states rather than
population. The Senate's role in choosing justices thus became a vehicle for
the states as entities to exercise influence on the distribution of power. At
that later point, there was reason to force the Senate to share authority for
judicial appointments with the president, a nationally elected officer.2"
15 U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2, cl. 2.
1, It is dangerous business to draw significant inferences from what little we know
of the Convention debates or, for that matter, any historical materials. I do not refer
to the documentary record behind the appointments clause to make or to underscore
major points. The paragraph in the text reflects conventional wisdom.
11 See Feld, Separation of Powers: Boundaries or Balance?, 21 GA. L. REV. 171
(1987) (describing the interplay between "separation of powers" and "checks and
balances").
,8 M. FARRAND, I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
232-33 (1937) [hereinafter RECORDS].
" Id.
20 See II RECORDS, supra note 18, at 80-81. See generally Blumoff, Separation of
Powers and the Origins of the Appointments Clause, 37 SYRACUsE L. REV. 1037,
1061-70 (1987) (tracing the history of the appointments clause). A series of speakers
at the Convention opposed assigning the selection ofjudges to the president alone on
the ground that the executive would use such power for his own ends. John Rutledge
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The joint participation of the executive and the Senate in choosing judges
unquestionably ushers politics into the selection scheme. It is hardly debat-
able that the president will attend to political considerations in making
nominations. By the same token, the Senate may well counter the presi-
dent's political strategy with its own.2 ' Certainly our national history since
1787 demonstrates that the principal players have routinely regarded the
judicial selection process as an arena for political maneuvering.2 2 Of course,
insisted, for example, that the new government would appear to be a monarchy if
judges were appointed by a "single person." I RECORDS, supra note 18, at 119. Other
members, James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris among them, opposed resting the
appointment power in the Senate in order to avoid "intrigues, partiality, and con-
cealment." Id. Wilson contended that wisdom resided in leaving judicial appoint-
ments to "a single, responsible person." Id.; see Ferling, The Senate and Federal
Judges: The Intent of the Founding Fathers, 2 CAPITOL STUDIES 57, 62-63 (1974).
21 I hasten to make clear that, in my view, the president must conform to constitu-
tional standards even in the nomination of policymaking staff in the executive branch
and, indeed, in the appointment of the White House chef and park rangers. The
occasion for invoking the Constitution regarding appointive officers is not, then, the
status of the federal judiciary in the national governmental structure. The point in the
text is only that the Senate enjoys a telling authority with respect to judicial appoint-
ments and that, in this instance, the nature of the Supreme Court justifies special
senatorial attention to the president's nominations. Just now, I mean only to ac-
knowledge that the Senate will have politics in mind in its work; later, I will identify
the constitutional standards that must also affect the Senate's judgment. In those
instances in which the Senate gives "Advice and Consent" with respect to other
"Officers of the United States" in the executive branch, the president's legitimate
interest in naming men and women with his own policy-orientation may be due more
indulgence. The individual elected to the presidency of the United States cannot
personally perform the functions constitutionally contemplated for that office. Ac-
cordingly, it may, indeed, be unconstitutional, pursuant to article II or the tripartite
balance of power struck by the Constitution's structure, for the Senate to hamstring
the president by refusing to approve political operatives to "head" federal depart-
ments and other policymaking arms of the executive branch. But see infra Part V
(discussing the possibility that Congress might establish a new Department of Judicial
Selection).
22 H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINT-
MENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (1985); K. HALL, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: LOWER
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION AND THE SECOND PARTY SYSTEM, 1829-61 (1979); J.
HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 302-24 (1953); D. O'BRIEN,
JUDICIAL ROULETTE 29-48 (1988); Black, A Note on Senatorial Consideration of
Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657 (1970); Chase, Federal Judges: The
Appointing Process, 51 MINN. L. REV. 185 (1966); Frank, The Appointment of
Supreme Court Justices: Prestige, Principles and Politics, 1941 Wis. L. REV. 172
(Part I), 343 (Part II), 461 (Part III); Ross, The Functions, Roles, and Duties of the
Senate in the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 633,
659-61 (1987); see also W. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 235 (1987) (explaining
that the president may properly take politics into account in nominating candidates
for the Court).
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the president cannot expect nominations to be confirmed routinely in the
Senate in order that justices should be chosen after the fashion of lieutenants
in the executive branch. In the case of cabinet members and other high-level
administrative officers, it can be claimed that the president, having been
elected to pursue policies discussed in the campaign, must be permitted to
place persons personally committed to those policies into positions of au-
thority to carry them out. The Supreme Court, by contrast, is not an
instrument of executive policy but, by design, an independent branch of the
national government.
Modem arguments to the effect that the Senate's role is only to appraise
candidates' formal credentials or "qualifications" 2 3 derive alternatively from
the happenstance that most nominees have not been controversial of late and
from tendentious rhetoric portraying political opposition as illegitimate-for
the rather obvious purpose of gaining approval for candidates likely to
attract political doubt.2 4 The constitutional framework contemplates quite a
different arrangement. The executive will attempt to advance a political
agenda through appointments to the Court, the Senate will answer in kind,
and out of the resulting conflict will come conciliation, cooperation, and
compromise .2 There is ample support, then, for the view that the Constitu-
23 1 put this word "qualifications" in quotations to flag it for inestigation below.
See infra Part IV(B)(1).
24 See, e.g., Will, The Democrats' Glass Chin, NEWSWEEK, JULY 20, 1987, at 66
(contending that the Senate's role is "to address threshold questions about moral
character, legal skills and judicial temperament" and insisting that Democrats could
not legitimately oppose Robert Bork's appointment to the Supreme Court on political
grounds); Johnston, Reagan Hints at Bork Nomination Strategy: Stress Credentials,
Not Views, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1987, at 14, col. I (underscoring the strategic purpose
for urging the Senate to "keep politics out of the confirmation process"); see
Greenhouse, Making a Federal Case of the Bork Nomination, N.Y. Times, Aug.
12, 1987, at B6, col. 1 (demonstrating that all sides may engage in the same rhetorical
strategy).
25 This is not to suggest that the constitutional scheme necessarily augurs for
colorless judicial candidates upon whom politicians with disparate political perspec-
tives can agree. But see Friedman, Balance Favoring Restraint, 9 CARDOZO L. REv.
15, 17 (1987) (contending that Senate consideration of ideology will encourage the
appointment of"the bland and the mediocre"). The structure may, however, impede
the appointment ofjustices with "extreme" views. See, e.g., Dworkin, From Bork to
Kennedy, N.Y. Review of Books, Dec. 17, 1987, at 36, col. 2 (concluding that
President Reagan's ultimate shift to Judge Anthony Kennedy represented a defeat for
Judge Bork's understanding of constitutionalism). But cf. Safire, Upgrade the Court,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1987, at A23, col. 4 (resisting the argument that moderates
should be preferred for membership on the Supreme Court). And some argue that the
structure should result in compromise. See Considering Bork Calmly, Boston Globe,
July 19, 1987, at 86, col. I (contending that Judge Bork should not be confirmed if"his
views could shift the court balance to one extreme in a way that might be detrimental
to the nation"); Wicker, The Bork Question, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1987, at 27, col. 6
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tion relies upon structural arrangements to police political skirmishing over
judicial selection.
It hardly follows, however, that the Constitution bears on judicial selec-
tion only inasmuch as it orchestrates political influences on appointments.
The Constitution is replete with structural arrangements of this kind, each of
which may be cited as an effort to safeguard liberty by indirection. One body
of the Congress cannot enact legislation without the other, the president
enjoys a veto power, and the states may call for another convention. Yet no
one supposes that any such checks occupy the field, providing the only
means by which the Constitution restricts the exercise of power. We do not
take legislation originating in the House to be valid simply because the
Senate, too, adopted the bill and the president signed it. Arguing thatjudicial
appointments can be made on the basis of politics unrestrained by ordinary
constitutional standards simply because the appointments clause disperses
the political influences brought to bear is rather like arguing that the only
restraint on presidential power is impeachment. 6 Marvelous as our constitu-
tional system may be, it is not "a machine that would go of itself."'27
(insisting that the Senate should look carefully into Bork's record and determine
whether Bork was a "radical" who could upset the rights of citizens). I only mean to
argue that interest-group politics do not threaten liberty vitally, so long as gov-
ernmental power is dispersed and no single individual or group can dominate consis-
tently to others' detriment. Nominations that Professor Ackerman has called "trans-
formative," in the sense that they are meant to effect a change in constitutional law,
are more worrisome. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1164, 1165 (1988) (comparing "transformative" appointments as a means of constitu-
tional change with the more institutional process specified in article V). Yet experi-
ence shows that presidents are unlikely to be successful in that vein. Id. at 1183
(noting that justices tend to observe precedent and generally do not "merely serve as
well-paid servants of the President who put them in office").
26 Instances in which structural relationships occupy the field are rare. Compare
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985) (relying on
political safeguards to restrain overreaching by Congress in the exercise of the
commerce power) with Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671
(1981) (invalidating a state regulation of interstate commerce while recognizing that
Congress might have enacted superseding legislation-but had not). It may also be
pertinent to keep in mind the Supreme Court's increasing enthusiasm for enforcing
separation-of-powers principles through litigation. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 732-34 (1986) (invalidating the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act). In Part V, I
describe methods by which executive and legislative officers and bodies can use their
positions in the constitutional structure to ensure that other constitutional actors
respect procedural and substantive standards for judicial selection-also constitu-
tionally established.
217 James Russell Lowell coined the phrase "a machine that would go of itself" in
1888. The passage reads as follows:
After our Constitution got fairly into working order it really seemed as if we had
invented a machine that would go of itself, and this begot a faith in our luck
which even the civil war itself but momentarily disturbed .... We are a nation
19891
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Nor do the express terms of the appointments clause suggest that struc-
tural limits on power occupy the field. In the case of Supreme Courtjustices,
the president is given the authority to "nominate." That term must, how-
ever, be interpreted. It is not self-evident that it must mean that the president
can pick anyone for whatever purposes and without regard for any standard
save personal predilections. Certainly it is unwarranted to assume that the
selection of judges is merely "patronage. ' 2 8 Constitutional standards can
and do govern presidential nominationsjust as they delimit any other form of
executive behavior-and for the same reason. The president, like all federal
officials, is sworn to uphold the Constitution. 9 The Senate's authority to
give "Advice and Consent" must similarly be interpreted against the back-
ground of constitutional standards that control legislative duties of all
kinds. 30
In sum, the appointments clause does not end the Constitution's concern
for the choice of Supreme Court justices; it merely specifies the elements of
government that will apply constitutional standards and establishes the
framework within which those standards will be brought into play. As to
judges in the lower federal courts, the appointments clause is more oblique.
District and circuit judges are probably "inferior officers" who may be
named by "the President alone," by the "Courts of Law," or by the "Heads
of Departments" according to the wishes of Congress. 31 Certainly nothing in
the appointments clause suggests that only politics need be considered. 31
The case for surrendering judicial selection entirely to politics is even
which has struck oil, but we are also a nation that is sure the well will never run
dry. And this confidence in our luck with the absorption in material interests,
generated by unparalleled opportunity, has in some respects made us neglectful
of our political duties.
M. KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 125 (1986). Dean Choper's attempt to defend wholly structural
safeguards only with respect to federalism and separation-of-powers matters also
meets difficulty. See Sager, Constitutional Triage, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 707 (1981).
28 Solomon, The Politics of Appointment and the Federal Courts' Role in Regulat-
ing America: U.S. Courts of Appeals Judgeships from T.R. to F.D.R., 1984 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 285, 286-87 (ascribing this view to most "legal scholars and legal
historians").
29 This is true even when the president's action is most obviously political in its
policy orientation. We fully expect that the president will feel free to veto legislative
bills on political grounds. Yet, I expect all would agree that the Constitution would be
violated if the president were to exercise the veto power for the purpose of punishing
African Americans.
30 See, e.g., Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to
Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REv. 57, 63-64 (1986) (arguing that the Constitu-
tion requires Congress to determine the constitutionality of proposed enactments,
especially in "political question" cases).
31 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
32 See infra Part V.
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weaker at the state level. It is not that the fourteenth amendment expressly
refers to state judges and specifies the basis on which they are to be
chosen-any more than it lays down precise rules for the conduct of any
other state business. The critical point is that the equal protection and due
process clauses recognize no exception for judicial selection. Their mandate
runs to all state action. While those provisions must be interpreted for
purposes of any concrete application, it seems clear that when executive
authorities, legislators, and judges are selected those constitutional provi-
sions have something to say. Just what that something may be is another
question, to which I will return.
II. UNWARRANTED WORRIES: DISCOVERABLE STANDARDS
AND POPULAR ELECTIONS
The inadequacy of the argument that the Constitution relegates judicial
selection to politics suggests that something else drives the common hesi-
tancy to identify and apply constitutional standards in this context. Simply
put, there is doubt that constitutional standards for choosing judges can be
identified and honed in a satisfying manner.3 3 Anticipating failure in any such
quest, we disclaim the responsibility to launch it.
We may have many reasons to worry about our constitutionalism, but this
is not one of them. There is nothing all so unmanageable about modern
constitutional analysis generally. Even such expansive notions as due pro-
cess and equal protection can generate workable doctrine and acceptable
results.34 To be sure, constitutional law has ragged edges, and in the hands of
imaginative interpreters it can take surprising shape. But this is merely to
acknowledge the value judgments on which decisionmakers necessarily de-
pend in forging meaning for legal materials. 35 It is simply misguided to think
that conventional checks on governmental power cannot be groomed to fit
judicial selection. The task of determining the constitutionality of executive
and legislative action is never easy, but it is no more difficult here than
anywhere else.
33 Another relative of the "political question" doctrine seems to be in play-
namely the claim that there are no "judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving" the judicial selection question. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
34 Cf. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1966) (holding that a federal
criminal conspiracy statute was not impermissibly vague merely because it au-
thorized indictments charging violations of the equal protection clause).
11 This, of course, is a common acknowledgment of long standing in American
constitutional law. See, e.g., G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 35-63
(1976) (describing the values that Kent, Story, and Shaw brought to early constitu-
tional treatments of property). While controversial versions of the same idea have
appeared in the Critical Legal Studies literature, I take the point in the text to be
consistent with the better reasoned presentations within even that genre. See, e.g.,
Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984).
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Things would be troublesome if it were assumed, as it is in some quarters,
that if there is any constitutional standard for choosing judges, it is popular-
ity-the test applied in selecting other agents of governmental authority in a
democracy.36 The possibility that candidates could run for office in popular
elections might recommend itself as an answer to our ambivalence regarding
the content of constitutional standards for filling judicial positions. The
argument for judicial elections is bolstered by the widespread acknowledge-
ment that courts make law in company with legislatures. The counter-
majoritarian difficulty and a battery of problems like it might be resolved
simply by subjecting judges to the discipline of the polls. 3
Yet the prospect that the search for constitutional standards for selecting
judges may lead to elections is unsettling. Judicial elections would upset the
structural arrangements established by the appointments clause and article
III for the maintenance of federal judicial independence and thus would
threaten the "separation of powers" and "checks and balances"
safeguards. 38 Constitutionally mandated judicial elections would also re-
36 See Golomb, Selection of the Judiciary: For Election, in JUDICIAL SELECTION
AND TENURE 74, 75 (G. Winter ed. 1973) (advocating the election of judges) [here-
inafter JUDICIAL SELECTION].
37 Note, however, that the actual response to the recognition of the policymaking
role of the Supreme Court has been wider participation in the confirmation process.
Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1146, 1157 (1988). An election may be employed both as a process by which public
officers are chosen, with each voter applying selection standards known only to him
or her, and as a substantive basis for accepting an elected official's authority to rule,
with the aggregated preferences of a majority of voters being sufficient to justify the
exercise of governmental power. Cf. Sager, supra note 9 (making the point in a
different context). In the text, I have in mind the latter function. Thus it may be
proposed thatjudges are entitled to do what they do only if they obtained their offices
by winning popular support.
31 The mere existence of constitutional text providing for the appointment of
federal judges does not necessarily settle the question whether federal judges could
be elected. The fifth amendment's due process clause and the wealth of constitutional
analysis built up in this century postdate those provisions in the body of the original
document. Subsequent constitutional developments may supersede important sec-
tions of the Constitution, and it is at least conceivable that long-established and
accepted understandings respecting federal judges may have to be discarded in the
wake of modem reappraisal. The thirteenth amendment abolished slavery, previ-
ously recognized in the Constitution as valid, albeit implicitly. The seventeenth
changed the method of choosing senators; the twenty-first repealed the eighteenth.
Nor is appointment essential to maintaining judges' independence from popular
sentiment. Whatever the means of selection at the outset, a guarantee of lengthy
tenure can protect sitting judges as they render what may be unpopular decisions.
See Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Selection: A View from The
Federalist Papers, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1669, 1680-89 (1988). But see Redish &
Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process,
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verse our widely acclaimed turn away from electoral schemes for choosing
judges in hopes of mitigating the ills of such elections and generating jurists
of greater "merit. ' 39 The ground now held by the "merit" system cham-
pioned by the American Judicature Society and other reform-minded groups
would be painful to lose.
40
Here again, however, there is no cause for alarm. Our best scholarship
demonstrates that the task assigned to judges in constitutional cases is
95 YALE L.J. 455, 496 (1986) (contending that the election of state judges may deprive
litigants of an independent tribunal-a denial of due process).
" The essentials of our unhappy experience with electing judges are well known.
The original states entrusted the selection of judges to their legislatures or governors
and, apparently to ensure independence, most of those states accorded to judges so
selected tenure during good behavior. E. HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF
JUDGES 98-99 (1944) (pointing out as well that in a number of states the legislature
appointed the governor). See Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution:
English and American Precedents, 1969 SuP. CT. REV. 135, 138-47 (summarizing the
rules pertaining to the selection and tenure of judges in the original states). None
shifted to judicial elections until the early 1800s, by which time the consuming force
of popular democracy in Europe and America recommended the election of any and
all government officials. See M. VOLCANSEK & J. LAFON, JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE
CROSS-EVOLUTION OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACTICES 75-98 (1988) (noting par-
ticularly the influence of the French Revolution). The election of judges, in Evan
Haynes's telling, was "a mere item in a long list of other democratic and humanita-
rian changes." E. HAYNES, supra, at 89. Notwithstanding eloquent warnings from
Justice Story and others, the trend accelerated during the Jacksonian period and
through the Civil War. See J. STORY, Progress of Jurisprudence, in MISCELLANEOUS
WRITINGS 198, 208-11 (2d printing 1972). With judicial elections, of course, came
allegations of abuse, corruption, and general malfeasance. Id. (setting forth Story's
speech); see also E. HAYNES, supra, at 98 n.20 (citing a speech by Rufus Choate at
the 1853 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention); 2 Official Report of the Debate
and Procedures in the State Convention to Revise and Amend the Const. of Mass.
799-811 (1853), reprinted in 17 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 10, 10-20 (1933) (setting
forth Choate's speech). For a review of current state selection schemes, see M.
COMISKY & P. PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY-SELECTION, COMPENSATION, ETHICS,
AND DISCIPLINE 3-37 (1987).
40 See generally Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure-Its
Historical Development, in JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 36, at 29-44 (discussing
the evolution of the merit plan in this century). Some notable names have been
associated with the movement toward the appointment of judges. See, e.g., Laski,
The Technique of Judicial Appointment, 24 MICH. L. REV. 529, 531-32 (1926) (con-
tending that the public will not necessarily choose the best candidates); Pound, The
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 20 J. AM. JUDI-
CATURE SOC'Y 178, 180 (1937) (suggesting that voters may select unqualified judges);
Taft, The Selection and Tenure of Judges, 38 REP. A.B.A. 418 (1913) (arguing against
judicial elections). See generally J. GROSSMAN, LAWYERS AND JUDGES: THE ABA
AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION (1965) (describing the American Bar
Association's role in efforts to choose federal judges according to "merit").
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emphatically not to exercise majoritarian power but to enforce admittedly
nonmajoritarian principle-which may conflict with majority preferences of
the moment.41 Mainstream American legal thinking distinguishes primarily
representative governmental bodies (like legislatures) from primarily
judgmental institutions (like courts).42 Thus while it may be acceptable on
occasion to explain that legislators are elected on the ground that their
function is to substitute for the public at large, the same contention cannot
be made respecting judges, who are not supposed to represent anyone.
Judges make law, to be sure, but they do not vindicate the perceived
aggregate preferences of the electorate; they do not serve as surrogates for a
majority of citizens who, if asked, might decide cases by a nose count.
Judges do not guess at the results a referendum might produce but engage in
a subtle and sophisticated analysis of what the law ought to be. Popular
election is only one constitutionally valid basis for choosing (state) judges.
Appointive schemes are perfectly acceptable so long as they incorporate
attention to the constitutional considerations developed in Part III. Those
standards serve democratic values even though judges are not elected di-
rectly but are named to the bench by other governmental agents-who, of
course, are themselves elected.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
The search for the Constitution's meaning for judicial selection begins
where any constitutional inquiry must-with the text and its interpretive
41 This thinking benefits, of course, from the lessons of legal realism. See J.
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 121 (1930) (explaining that judges routinely
create new law). See generally L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960
3-10 (1986). And it survives rhetoric from both the left and the right. I have in mind,
on the left, those elements of the Critical Legal Studies movement that attack
adjudication in the liberal state as a thinly veiled effort on the part of those in power
to further their own preferences. See, e.g., Tushnet, Perspectives on Critical Legal
Studies: Introduction, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239, 240-41 (1984). On the right, some
vendors of the law-and-economics approach to legal problems also look upon the
work of judges as the reflection of preferences. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Ways of
Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 815 (1982).
42 Kornhauser and Sager make clear that the genuine distinction is not between
governmental institutions themselves but between functions performed by those
institutions. They point out that it is possible and entirely appropriate for a single
governmental institution to engage in decisionmaking of all or most types and that the
nature of institutions' proper purpose or purposes determines the appropriateness of
a model of decisionmaking for the particular exercise. Kornhauser & Sager, Unpack-
ing the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 91-92 (1986). For my purposes, however, it is
sufficient to distinguish legislatures from courts on the basis of the primary function
performed by each.
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history. 43 Yet the realistic pursuit of constitutional law in action leads
43 In this discussion I lay aside two intractable intellectual issues that have at-
tracted attention of late. First, the very existence of the Constitution seems anoma-
lous in a political system that purports to be democratic. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 11 (1980) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST]. A written fundamental law seems to contemplate that the will of
those who drafted, proposed, and ratified it can in some fashion control the wishes of
later generations. One who comes to terms with constitutionalism, moreover, faces a
second problem: the claim that the text of the Constitution, or, indeed, any text,
holds no determinable meaning apart from the significance it is given by its interpret-
ers. A sizeable body of opinion ascribes to text a life of its own, an existence
unburdened by the responsibility to communicate ideas. By this account, the creator
enjoys no authorial sovereignty over language reduced to writing; a text is not a mere
tool for conveying meaning to others. Constitutionalism is thus not only incoherent in
a democracy; it is impossible in any political system. See generally S. FISH, Is THERE
A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980)
(arguing that interpretation is inherently subjective); THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETA-
TION (W.J.T. Mitchell ed. 1983) (collecting essays); Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1985) (discussing theories of interpretation generally); Law and Literature, 60
TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982) (discussing the complexities of interpretation in both law and
literature); Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984) (arguing that rules that
purport to impose objective limits on interpretation are themselves subjectively
interpreted). But see Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739
(1982) (arguing that objective rules impose limits on legal interpretation). This prob-
lem, too, must be negotiated if we are to get on to still others. Professor Sager has
recently landed some impressive blows against the problem of the Constitution itself.
Sager, supra note 9 (arguing that majoritarianism "sponsors a crabbed and implausi-
ble view" of constitutional law and describing rights-bearing provisions as "instanti-
ations of a more general and interpretively fertile conception of political justice").
And Robert Cover spent his last academic efforts on the relationship between legal
analysis and interpretation generally. Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion: Of the Word, the Deed, and the Role, 20 GA. L. REV. 815, 816 (1986) (arguing
that legal analysis is "inextricably bound up with the real threat or practice of violent
deeds"); see also Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1628-29 (1986)
(contending that there are "limits to the commonality and coherence of meaning that
can be achieved in legal interpretation"); cf. Leubsdorf, Deconstructing the Con-
stitution, 40 STAN. L. REV. 181 (1987) (insisting that many voices may speak through
a constitutional text).
Moving (right along) to other preliminary matters, it is common currency that our
constitutional history is strewn with failed attempts to explain judicial review. I
hardly attempt here to provide a complete discussion. See Fallon, A Constructivist
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194-
1209 (1987) (presenting as good a list as any of the current forms of constitutional
argumentation). Nineteenth-century formalism largely ignored the problem, and calls
to "originalism" are more strident and simplistic than they are probing and persua-
sive. On the many faces of formalism, see Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509
(1988). For illustrations of "originalism," see Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 360 (1979); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,
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quickly to the doctrine the Supreme Court fashions and refashions each
October Term.44 As we shall see, that doctrine is driven by underlying
philosophical ideas about the way in which free women and men should
govern and be governed.
Inasmuch as the equal protection clause supplies a specific textual basis
for the equality idea in constitutional law, that clause has been the
springboard for doctrinal innovations ranging well beyond the fourteenth
amendment's own confines. The formulation is familiar. The Court insists at
the outset that classifications found in governmental policies are instrumen-
tal in nature; they serve and must serve some "legitimate" objective of the
police power. 45 Most classifications are sustained if they rationally further
some such objective. 46 Others must bear a "substantial" relation to an
"important" objective; 47 still others must be "necessary" to some "compel-
ling" governmental end. 48 To the casual reader, then, the validity of any
given policy appears to turn on the "fit" between the classification it em-
bodies and the mischief the government wishes to eradicate. And equal
protection analysis is apparently reduced to arid logic. 49
On closer examination, it appears that the fit between classifications and
objectives is not critical in itself but is a mechanism for detecting the state's
true ends-which do determine the validity of the policy in issue. Thus, for
example, a race classification's relation to an apparently legitimate gov-
54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976); see also Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal
Realism, and the Interpretation of"This Constitution", 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177 (1987)
(offering a description of variations and similarities within originalist writings). A
host of rigorous critiques have nailed the originalist coffin shut. See, e.g., Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 238 (1980)
(arguing that "one can better protect fundamental values and the integrity of demo-
cratic processes by protecting them than by guessing how other people meant to
govern a different society a hundred or more years ago"); Dworkin, The Forum of
Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 470-71 (1979) (arguing that judges cannot deter-
mine original intent in any case); Hazard, Rising Above Principle, 135 U. PA. L.
REv. 135, 164 (1986) (pronouncing originalism "untenable").
44 See Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 211 (1985)
(discussing the formulaic style of constitutional lawmaking).
41 See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1985) (invalidating a
provision of a state constitution because the purpose was not "legitimate").
46 See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (sustain-
ing a New York City traffic regulation even though it failed to address all traffic
hazards).
41 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (discussing a gender-based
classification).
41 See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (addressing a racial classifica-
tion).
" For an exhaustive treatment of the necessary fit between means and ends in
equal protection analysis, see Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New
Model, 36 UCLA L. REv. 447 (1989).
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ernmental purpose is strictly scrutinized in order to ensure that the objective
put forward to justify it actually explains the policy under attack. 0 Most
such classifications are struck down, ostensibly because they are not
deemed to be necessary to a legitimate and compelling objective, but actu-
ally in an abundance of caution. The Court would rather reject even race-
conscious rules that appear to have some rational explanation than risk
mistaken approval of race classifications actually created in response to
impermissible, racist sentiments.
This insight, born of attempts to forge a satisfying equal protection analy-
sis, reverberates across a range of constitutional problems, forcing courts
and commentators alike to focus on the purposes, stated and unstated, for
which government acts.5 1 The emphasis on purpose underscores two related
questions: how it is that the Court can assume that government must have
objectives for its legislative enactments and how it is that the Court can
presume to pronounce any such objectives constitutionally illegitimate. The
best of recent scholarship makes its most important contributions at this
50 This explanation was initially advanced in the literature. See, e.g., Simon,
Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitu-
tional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1067 (1978);
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 43, at 145-48 (contending that strict scrutiny
is used to "flush out" unconstitutional legislative motivations); Baker, Outcome
Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131
U. PA. L. REV. 933, 992 (1983) (arguing that the sole purpose of multi-tiered review is
to determine the actual purpose behind a rule). Later, it was apparently embraced by
the Court. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 721-23
(1989) (indicating that "[i]ndeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out'
illegitimate uses of race"); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
439-42 (1985) (stating that legislative classifications the Court considers suspect "are
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy" and thus are subject to strict scrutiny);
see also Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1713 (1984) (arguing that the purpose of intermediate scrutiny in gender-
classification cases is to discover illegitimate legislative motivations); Note, Imper-
missible Purposes and the Equal Protection Clause, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1184, 1193
(1986) (identifying a stricter means-ends review for the same purpose even in nomi-
nally rationality-review cases); Note, Still Newer Equal Protection: Impermissible
Purpose Review in the 1984 Term, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1454, 1468 (1986) (noting the
same tendency).
51 Indeed, the crux of most modem constitutional analysis, touching equal protec-
tion and myriad other textual bases, is that valid governmental policymaking posits
some identifiable purpose .the Court is prepared to accept as constitutionally permis-
sible. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984)
(privileges and immunities clause, art. IV, § 2); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (dormant commerce clause); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977) (substantive due process). See generally Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Motive, 1971 Sup. CT.
REV. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
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juncture. The literature posits that legislative lawmaking is predominantly
instrumental, recognizes that courts require a theoretical basis for declaring
some legislative objectives out of bounds, and then supplies the necessary
working principle. That principle, in turn, is implemented through the Su-
preme Court's more concrete doctrine."
The ideas that have been floated are as disparate as they are stimulating,
and I should not wish to be understood to neglect either the intricacies of the
arguments or the profound differences of opinion everywhere apparent. Yet
for present purposes an overlap can be identified in the work of three
contributors who have been extraordinarily influential of late: Ronald Dwor-
kin, John Hart Ely, and Cass Sunstein. All three would agree, I think, that
American constitutional democracy looks to courts to ensure something
quite different from simple majoritarianism. Courts insist upon political
decisionmaking with a vision of the general, public interest-which, by its
nature, embraces all citizens as equals and accords equal weight to their
legitimate preferences .3
Dworkin approaches constitutional law from moral philosophy, insisting
that a satisfying explanation for judicial interpretation of the Constitution
depends on the recognition of a political morality traceable to the legal
practice that has ripened in this culture. Within his larger jurisprudential
framework, Dworkin proposes that law of any ilk is "structured" by a
"coherent set of principles about justice and fairness and procedural due
process" in the relevant society. 4 In constitutional cases, judges are called
upon to shape their decisions to the "most basic arrangements of political
power in the community," thus to "draw from the most philosophical
reaches of political theory." 55 The "interpretive attitude" Dworkin urges
upon judges contemplates that legal phenomena do not merely "exist"; they
have positive "value.1 5 6 They serve "some interest or purpose" or enforce
"some principle."517 They have, Dworkin states bluntly, some "point"
52 Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411
(1981) (noting a revival of "Grand Theory" in constitutional scholarship).
53 See Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1502, 1503 (1985) (pointing out that Sunstein and others attempt not so much to
"allay" concern for the countermajoritarian difficulty as to "displace" it).
54 LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 8, at 243. For Dworkin, the genuine challenge arises
in "hard" cases, in which no "right" interpretation of existing legal materials
recommends itself after judges discard demonstrably aberrant possibilities inconsis-
tent with the "brute facts of legal history." Id. at 255-56; see also TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY, supra note 8, at chs. 4-5 (discussing judges' duty to discover a party's
rights in "hard cases"). Faced with such cases, judges should choose results from
"eligible interpretations" that show the community's public standards in a "better
light from the standpoint of political morality." LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 8, at 256.
55 LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 8, at 380.
56 Id. at 46-47.
57 Id.
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which influences the meaning that can be assigned to them over time.58
Suffice it to say, this "point" partakes of the "public standards" it is the
task of interpretation to vindicate. Dworkin thus recognizes the very same,
or at least very similar, instrumentalism apparent in the Court's current
constitutional doctrine. In his view, the notion that rules must further legiti-
mate objectives in order to be valid is explained as an essential element of
the very nature of law as a practice or set of practices with some identifiable
purpose.
Dworkin rejects any suggestion that simple majorities can do what they
will, restricted only by propositions they themselves accept. He recognizes
individual "rights" against majoritarian power and insists that one such right
is the entitlement of all citizens to be treated "as equals." 59 While majorities
can select from a range of policies, and certainly may establish rules that
treat people differently, they cannot neglect some citizens entirely in the
formulation of policy. Rather, majorities must, if they operate properly,
accord "equal concern and respect" to all citizens in marking off the fu-
tureY0 It is a small step from here to say that majorities are restricted to
objectives in the "public interest," which necessarily includes concern for
the interests of all even if, in the end, some citizens receive fewer benefits or
bear heavier burdens than others. There is, then, a satisfying explanation for
judicial decisions that refuse to credit some objectives as constitutionally
acceptable. Legislatures are empowered to rhake policy through law so long
as the "point" of that policy is consistent with individual "rights," including
the right to be treated as an equal. The source of this right is the courts'
effort to plumb the culture's public morality in order to interpret the Con-
stitution in a way that shows the idea of equality in its best light-given our
518 Dworkin distinguishes two assumptions underlying the "interpretive attitude"
judges should strike. One, noted in the text, is that legal practices are instrumental;
the other is that explicit rules in pursuance of some "point" may change, but in
changing remain "sensitive" to the "point." Id. at 47-48. As Fred Schauer has
explained, the "point" of a measure under examination is not (for Dworkin) limited
to the immediate purpose for which it was promulgated but extends to the more
abstract "point" back of "the entire system." Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Rea-
sons, 85 MICH. L. REV. 847, 854 (1987). Dworkin's insistence that every judicial
decision must be reconciled with the ultimate reaches of the jurisprudential universe
in which the decision is made asks of legal propositions much more than does current
constitutional doctrine. Still, it seems fair to identify the instrumentalism embedded
in his theory and to link that purposive perspective (however roughly) to the constitu-
tional standards I mean to explore.
59 LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 8, at 376, 381.
60 Accordingly, under Dworkin's "banned sources" account of a race discrimina-
tion claim, race-conscious rules are invalid if they aggregate preferences stemming
from racial bigotry. Id. at 384. Preferences "that are rooted in some form of prejudice
against one group can never count in favor of a policy that includes the disadvantage
of that group." Id.
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philosophical history. Dworkin denies that all this is in any fashion undemo-
cratic.6' By contrast, he asserts that the Constitution is the "parent and
guardian" of democracy as we Americans know it-and that we know it to
insist upon respect for rights rooted in our moral history.62 When, accord-
ingly, Dworkin's ideal judge, Hercules, presumes to hold a statute invalid,
he does so in furtherance of his "most conscientious judgment" about what
the Constitution "really means" and what democracy "really is." 63
In sharp contrast to Dworkin's appeal to moral theory, Ely offers process,
not substance, as ajustification for judicial review. He finds little agreement
among moral philosophers and few substantive values incorporated into the
constitutional text. Courts, in his view, should therefore devote their efforts
to the maintenance of a structure, which is enshrined in the Constitution,
governing the way in which momentary majorities resolve policy disputes.6 4
For Ely, the nature of the American system as a representative democracy
implies that, all things being equal, determinations of good policy are made
by "elected representatives" whose choices are entitled to prevail.65 If the
people object, they are free to turn the rascals out. If, however, the rep-
resentative process malfunctions, such that it is no longer worthy of trust,
courts may exercise a veto in the name of process-purification. Mere dissat-
isfaction with legislative results is, by Ely's account, insufficient to warrant
judicial interference-even if the action under examination conflicts with
moral traditions and values courts can, or think they can, identify. Rather,
judicial override is justified when those in power are "choking off the
channels of political change" to maintain their advantage with respect to
out-groups or when legislators representing a majority systematically deni-
grate the interests of minorities "out of simple hostility or a prejudiced
refusal to recognize commonalities of interest .... "66
As far from Dworkin as he may be (and that is quite far),67 Ely neverthe-
61 Dworkin concedes, of course, that the very notion of any individual right in the
teeth of majority preferences demands explanation in a democracy. But he rejects
both the contention that the Constitution is itself undemocratic and the contention
that, in this constitutional scheme, democracy is interchangeable with ma-
joritarianism. Id. at 398-99.
62 Id.
63 Id. But see Stick, Literary Imperialism: Assessing the Results of Dworkin's
Interpretive Turn in Law's Empire, 34 UCLA L. REV. 371, 422-23 (1986) (underscor-
ing that Dworkin's theory permits courts to override majoritarian decisions and thus
to impose outcomes without explicit consent).
64 DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 43, at 57-58 (rejecting guidance from
moral philosophy); id. at 90 (contending that the Constitution primarily establishes
structure).
65 Id. at 103.
66 Id.
67 Dworkin marks himself off from Ely in Dworkin, supra note 43, at 500-10
(rejecting any argument that the courts should focus exclusively on process). Ely
critiques some features of Dworkin's work in Ely, Professor Dworkin's External
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less recognizes and, indeed, relies heavily upon some ideas also identifiable
in Dworkin's work. Those ideas, in turn, are precisely the elements of the
constitutional analysis in which we are interested. Ely, too, builds his
explanation for judicial behavior in constitutional cases around the expecta-
tion that legislatures make law instrumentally-for reasons. Inquiries into
the "intention" for which legislatures act "permeate" his approach to
constitutional law. 68 Moreover, some intentions are constitutionally imper-
missible. Indeed, in evaluating legislative purpose, Ely explicitly invokes
Dworkin's claim that citizens are entitled to "equal concern and respect. ' 69
For Ely, it is not enough that comparatively powerless individuals and
groups are permitted to speak and to vote, such that the political process is
formally open to all.70 When legislative "in-groups" neglect the interests of
legislative "out-groups" by attaching no weight to the latter's interests in the
making of policy, the product is for that reason constitutionally suspect.7'1
Compared to Dworkin, Ely appears to leave the legislative branch consider-
able room in which to operate. He forbids courts to judge the substantive
merits of legislation and limits them, instead, to an appraisal of the process
that produced it-process, albeit, in Ely's terms.72 What counts for present
purposes, however, is that Ely's arguments regarding judicial review allow
him to link his brand of constitutionalism to democracy properly under-
stood.7 3
Sunstein elaborates upon these same themes and relates them even more
tightly to current constitutional doctrine. He distinguishes the pluralist,
market model of politics so much in fashion in the 1950s and occasionally
Personal Preference Distinction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 959 (arguing that decisionmakers
may consider external as well as internal preferences).
66 DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 43, at 129-30.
1 Id. at 82.
70 Id. at 135.
71 Id. at 159.
72 Again, Ely does not mean to restrict judicial override to cases in which an
out-group has been barred from participating in the political process. Rather, he
would have the courts trump legislative choices that deny equal concern and respect
to such out-groups-however unobjectionable the formal political machinery may
appear to be. Id. at 136. For an argument that in this Ely cannot be solely ma-
joritarian, see Sager, supra note 9, at 9-13.
13 If anything more is needed, Ely draws upon the history of republican theory,
which, he contends, suggests that at least some American constitution-makers con-
ceived of the nascent government as one that would structure political life for a
society in which citizens enjoy equal legal footing. The equal respect idea is thus
located in the history behind the Constitution now to be interpreted. DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST, supra note 43, at 79. The Constitution's explicit exhortation to the
national government to "guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government," U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added), presents no occasion for
embarrassment. Republicanism is not majoritarianism but a check upon majoritarian
tyranny.
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embraced by modern theorists 74 from an older, republican conception of
politics ascribable to Madison.7 5 The latter model credits citizens and their
representatives with the ability to rise above private interest and, through
discussion, aspire to a more general "public good." ' 76 The primary threat to
good government is the corruption associated with factions; the core
safeguards for good government are arrangements ensuring that representa-
tives pursue the public good. This political theory approaches the instrumen-
talism with which Dworkin and Ely are concerned. Thus it is insufficient that
policy emerges from a legislative struggle among competing interests, the
product of a pooling of "naked preferences. ' 77 Government policy must
7" See, e.g., R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 137 (1956) (contend-
ing that the central theme in "American constitutional development has been the
evolution of a political system in which all the active and legitimate groups in the
population can make themselves heard at some crucial stage" in the decision pro-
cess); D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (2d ed. 1971) (arguing that indi-
viduals identify with groups and that those groups are as much a part of government
as political parties); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell. J. Econ. &
MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971) (examining the characteristics of the political process that allow
small groups to regulate the economy). See generally D. HELD, MODELS OF DEMOC-
RACY 186-220 (1987) (critizing Truman and Dahl's "classic" pluralism); cf. Sun-
stein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 906-08 (1987) (reading Holmes's
dissent in Lochner to reflect a pluralist attitude).
11 Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 42
(1985) (distinguishing modem pluralism from Madison's vision of a representative
government free to deliberate on the greater public good). But see Krouse,
'Classical' Images of Democracy in America: Madison and Tocqueville, in DEMO-
CRATIC THEORY AND PRACTICE 58, 62-67 (G. Duncan ed. 1983) (contending that
Madison actually rejected civic virtue in favor of an "interest-oriented principle").
76 Sunstein, supra note 75, at 31 (describing republican insistence that private
interests be subordinated to the public good). The standard sources for republican
theory are B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967) (arguing that Revolutionary leaders envisioned a republican government con-
trolled by independent citizens capable of separating themselves from the "petty
selfishness of ordinary men"); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUB-
LIC, 1776-1787, at 46-91 (1969) (tracing the history of American republicanism); see
also J. APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION
OF THE 1790s (1984) (demonstrating the ambiguities within American republican
thinking in the colonial period). Mark Tushnet insists that the very notion of the
public interest is inconsistent with conventional liberalism. Tushnet, supra note 53,
at 1539; cf. S. HOLMES, BENJAMIN CONSTANT AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
LIBERALISM 247-52 (1984) (recalling that nineteenth-century liberals such as Constant
discounted any objective notion of the public good). But see Dworkin, Liberalism, in
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113-43 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978) (claiming that
liberalism does include some notion of the public good-equality and fair systems of
distribution).
11 Sunstein, supra note 50, at 1689 (arguing that various provisions of the Constitu-
tion are intended to prevent the distribution of resources from being determined
solely by the exercise of raw political power).
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promote legitimate public values, identified through deliberations that take
all citizens' interests into account.78
Here again, the elements of current constitutional doctrine can be iden-
tified in a political theory that purports to be democratic: republicanism.
Sunstein rejects simple majoritarianism and seizes instead upon the rep-
resentative character of American government. Republicanism, as Madison
and others understood it, contemplates that legislative policies will not
justify themselves but must further some objective-and not any objective,
but one that comports with the public good as that matter is sorted out in
deliberations among duly elected representatives. In those deliberations, the
interests of all citizens must be accorded equal weight. While it is possible,
indeed likely, that policies in the public interest will burden different citizens
differently, it is never acceptable that the interests of some should be ignored
in the formulation of the objective to be pursued. Any such purpose is not in
the public interest and is therefore illegitimate constitutionally.79
It is plain from this brief survey that Dworkin, Ely, and Sunstein, each in
his own way, can be cited in aid of the "principled" constitutional democ-
racy that is ours.80 We neither have nor want a society ruled by raw
majoritarianism. To the contrary, we want and have a governmental system
in which politically accountable institutions fashion public policy under a
constitutional injunction to treat all citizens as equals. Governmental objec-
tives that neglect disfavored individuals and groups are for that reason
constitutionally impermissible. It remains to bring these ideas to bear on the
selection of judges.
IV. JUDICIAL SELECTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND
A. Procedural Standards
I begin with what may be called procedural constitutional standards for
judicial selection, that is, standards governing the way in which decision-
78 See also Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 73-75 (1986) (positing that the object of
self-government is freedom and that freedom consists of self-direction "by norms
cognizant of fellowship with equally self-directing others" and that "one realizes
one's own freedom only by confirming that of the others").
" Sunstein, supra note 75, at 51-52 (arguing that the Constitution requires rep-
resentatives to separate themselves from the struggle of private interests and to
promote the common good). But see Tushnet, supra note 53, at 1540-44 (marshalling
shortcomings in Sunstein's attempt to give content to the notion of public values).
80 Harper & Lupu, Fair Representation as Equal Protection, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1212, 1223-27 (1985) (noting that modem theorists reject strict majoritarianism in
favor of a democracy that includes protections against majority interest groups).
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makers locate candidates for judicial positions.8 1 The essential constitutional
requirement is plain enough: mechanisms for isolating judicial candidates
from the general population must further the public interest. The Constitu-
tion commands equal concern and respect for all citizens. It will not do,
then, to neglect some citizens or groups of citizens out of hostility to them or
their interests. A selection scheme is constitutional only if it manifests at
least the potential to generate candidates from any and all quarters wherein
qualified candidates8 2 who are constitutionally entitled to be considered may
be found.8 3
1. Judicial Elections
Schemes in which judges are elected test the principle of equal concern
and respect in a deceptive fashion. At first glance, it may appear that the
Constitution can be satisfied by simply applying to judicial elections the
familiar rules developed for ordinary electoral affairs. Thus, for example, the
prohibition on deliberate race discrimination, in all its forms, must be re-
spected in legislative and judicial elections alike.8 4 This is where the Con-
81 The procedural label is a bit misleading inasmuch as I mean to apply the
"legitimate public interest" test for governmental policyr--a matter, I should think,
of substance. Still, it seems helpful to distinguish what I contend for in this section
from the plainly substantive standards invoked in the next.
82 See infra Part IV(B)(1) (discussing candidate "qualifications").
11 See infra note 94.
14 Accord Voter Information Proj. v. City of Baton Rouge, 612 F.2d 208, 212 (5th
Cir. 1980) (invalidating an at-large scheme for electing city and state judges). It seems
sensible, moreover, to invoke statutory standards like the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982), as well-there being no reason to think, once elections are
posited, that racism demands any less attention in the context of selecting judges than
it does with respect to choosing any other governmental officials. It is settled already
that section 5 of the Act, the "preclearance" provision, is applicable. Haith v.
Martin, 618 F. Supp. 410, 412-13 (E.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901 (1986);accord
Kirksey v. Allain, 635 F. Supp. 347, 349 (S.D. Miss. 1986). The availability of section
2, the Voting Rights Act's substantive standard, is less certain. While the statutory
language is broad, and the legislative history thin, one reference to the ability of
voters "to elect representatives of their choice," § 1973 (emphasis added), supports
the contention that section 2 is inapplicable to judicial elections. But see Chisom v.
Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988); Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275, 281 (6th Cir.
1988); Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1200 (S.D. Miss. 1987)-all finding the
reference to "representatives" insufficient to prevent the application of section 2.
In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80 (1986), the Court held that a multi-
member election structure for the selection of legislators violated section 2. Kathy
Abrams has criticized Gingles for focusing primarily upon the capacity of minority
groups to elect candidates of their own to office and for according too little attention
to the ability of such groups to participate in political processes generally. Inasmuch
as my concern is not for black voters but for potential black judges, the emphasis in
the text on the performance of black candidates is not subject to the same criticism.
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stitution leads. Yet the analysis regarding judicial and legislative elections
must be quite different. Existing standards for the conduct of legislative
elections vindicate the right of citizens to vote for candidates of their
choice. 5 Having rejected the representational model for courts, we require
another justification for applying the same or similar standards to the elec-
tion of judges.8 6
There is no a priori rule for identifying judges in this society. Judges are
chosen deliberately, by a device established through governmental action.
That action, in turn, is subject to constitutional requirements, including the
requirement that all citizens be respected as equals. If, then, government
chooses to select judges by election, the machinery put in place must open
the field of candidates to all comers. No state can fairly claim to be choosing
judges constitutionally, this is to say democratically, if, for example, it
deliberately decides to elect candidates by way of a mechanism that denies
African Americans the opportunity to be chosen and thus excludes them
from power. Black candidates, by this account, are entitled to consideration
not merely because black voters may wish to support them but because their
exclusion would signify an electoral scheme that undervalues blacks and
their interest in serving on the bench.87
See Abrams, "Raising Politics Up": Minority Political Participation and Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449 (1988).
8. This is true of ordinary cases in which some citizens are barred from the polls,
e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating a
poll tax exacted as a precondition to voting), in vote "dilution" cases, e.g., City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (striking down an at-large scheme established
for the purpose of diluting a racial group's voting power), and in "one person/one
vote" cases, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559, 577 (1964) (holding that the
seats in a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis so
that one person's vote is counted equally with another's). Vindication of the right to
be fairly represented is also evident in the "ballot access" cases in which would-be
candidates assert the voting rights of supporters. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23 (1968) (invalidating excessive restrictions on access to the ballot).
86 See supra text accompanying notes 41-42. This is not to suggest that the
discussion that follows in the text is inapplicable to the selection of legislators. Quite
the contrary. It seems ineluctable (at least to me) that legislative candidates, too, are
entitled to be treated as equals in the process by which governmental officers are
chosen. I tie this argument to the selection of judges only because the alternative
ground (the entitlement of citizens to vote for whom they please) on which the
ballot-access cases rest in the legislative context is unavailable with respect to
judicial candidates.
87 The Supreme Court has thus far declined to extend the "one person/one vote"
principle to judicial elections. Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972)
(noting that judges serve people but do not represent them), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1095
(1973). That is unfortunate. It is true that judges do not represent constituents in the
familiar, legislative sense. Yet there is no self-evident explanation for weighting some
voters' preferences more than others in a system in which government chooses to
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Racial gerrymandering, stacking, staggered terms, numbered places,
anti-single-shot rules, and other discriminatory devices now held invalid in
legislative elections,88 albeit because of the burden on minority voters, are
invalid in the case ofjudicial elections for this different reason. On the other
hand, some arrangements that are objectionable when employed in legisla-
tive elections, may be less vulnerable when used in judicial elections.
Multi-member districts provide an example. 89 If judges do not represent
constituents in the manner of legislators, the argument for single-member
districts, some of which would elect minority candidates, appears to be
weakened. Once again, within the framework I have outlined, the constitu-
tional standard is not tied to the desire of voters to elect "their own" but to
the more subtle interest of people in being treated as equals by the electoral
scheme.9 0 Still, it seems clear that if multi-member districts are established
for the purpose of frustrating the election of African Americans to office,
they deny the equality of blacks and are thus constitutionally flawed.91
employ elections forjudicial selection. Wells, 409 U.S. at 1096-98 (White, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that the "one person/one vote" principle should apply since judges are
"state officials ... elected (or appointed) to carry out the state government's judicial
functions"); accord Holshouser v. Scott, 335 F. Supp. 928, 934-35 (M.D.N.C. 1971)
(Craven, J., dissenting) (recalling that judges serve all the people of a state-not
simply those who nominate them). Since the argument I want to make does not
depend upon the representational model for courts, however, the false step in the
"one person/one vote" case causes me no difficulty.
8 See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 627 (1982) (invalidating an at-large
voting system); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960) (holding racial
gerrymandering unconstitutional).
81 See, e.g., White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755, 764 (1973) (invalidating multi-
member legislative districts used invidiously to dilute the political power of racial
groups).
90 Of course, the incoming tide raises all boats. The arrival of more African
Americans on the bench may well generate greater sensitivity to racial factors in all
cases before all judges. Indeed, if I were to focus on the policy implications of
increasing the number of black judges, I might well contend for popular elections-in
order that blacks might further their own interests in districts in which they are in the
majority. Cf. Bennet, Black Judges, TRIAL MAO., Jan., 1976, at 4 (reporting on a
black judge who insisted that blacks would be more attentive to voters whom they
"represent"); Note, Civil Rights Enforcement and the Selection of Federal District
Court Judges, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 385 (1977) (reporting research supporting the
conclusion that the societal groups from which judges are chosen help to predict their
behavior in civil rights cases). In a similar vein, I would expect that an increase in the
number of female jurists would have its effect upon judicial behavior. See generally
Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988). For a further discussion of judicial elections and
sensitivity to racial factors, see infra note 102.
'1' For a discussion of recent suits about the use of at-large schemes in judicial
elections, see Nat'l Law J., Feb. 20, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
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The intellectual reach of this analysis extends to electoral systems that
neglect not only racial minorities but any groups of citizens entitled to be
treated as equals. Here, as elsewhere, any practical constitutional analysis
must focus upon those who have typically been the victims of mistreatment
in this society. Only they are likely to suffer the indignation about which we
are concerned. The moral significance of governmental action disparaging
such groups, moreover, provides a basis for special attention. The constitu-
tional standards applicable to judicial elections must attend, then, to dis-
crimination touching groups whose treatment generally arouses suspicion:
racial, ethnic, and language minorities, women, and perhaps some others. In
delimiting these groups, it is apparent that we cannot borrow wholesale from
the list of classifications identified in the cases as presumptively invidious
and thus warranting special scrutiny.9 2 For purposes ofjudicial elections, the
range of constitutionally "suspect" classifications within conventional equal
protection doctrine is both underinclusive (omitting women, for example)93
and overinclusive (including resident aliens).9 4
The more fruitful doctrinal referent is the notion of constitutionally "dis-
tinctive" groups, which has emerged from decisions regarding the sixth
amendment right to jury trials. 95 The Supreme Court has explained that dis-
tinctive groups are those the systematic exclusion of which would frustrate
the sixth amendment's command that jurors be selected from a cross-section
of the community. That cross-section requirement, in turn, rests upon the
92 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
93 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. In addition, gay and lesbian citizens
have not yet elicited appreciable sensitivity from the Supreme Court and thus have
not been heard to claim close scrutiny of legislative policies that affect them as a
class. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (manifesting substantial insen-
sitivity to the plight of gay citizens before legislative bodies). Yet it is difficult to
accept the notion that the Constitution is indifferent to judicial election schemes that
deny the equality of homosexuals. See DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 43, at
161-65 (noting that homophobia can block its own correction by intimidating its
victims); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a
Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985) (arguing that courts should
recognize homosexuality as a suspect classification for equal protection purposes).
94 Even if discrimination to the disadvantage of aliens elicits stringent judicial
scrutiny when attacked under the equal protection clause, it seems apparent that
aliens need not be considered for judgeships if, despite careful review, they can
constitutionally be excluded from holding some public posts. See, e.g., Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 81 (1979) (permitting public elementary schools to refuse to
employ resident aliens as teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 300 (1978)
(allowing aliens to be denied employment as police officers). But cf. Bernal v.
Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 228 (1984) (invalidating the exclusion of aliens from service as
notaries public).
9. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 367 (1978) (holding that women
are sufficiently numerous and distinct that they may not be systematically eliminated
from jury panels).
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need to ensure impartiality, to maintain public confidence in the criminal
process, and to foster a "sharing in the administration of justice" as a
"phase of civic responsibility.""6 This last is relevant here. It acknowledges
that the harm caused by excluding constitutionally distinctive groups goes
beyond any unfairness to the accused; it recognizes that the exclusion
threatens the civil duties, and we may say civil rights, of the individuals
excluded. 7 The central idea is that public decisions in this constitutional
democracy must be made with the interests of all in mind and, accordingly,
that the selection of those who will perform public functions cannot disre-
gard citizens for whom those in power have no moral regard-denying those
citizens the role to which they are entitled in a system in which the people
govern themselves. Constitutional standards for judicial elections must
therefore ensure that groups recognized as distinctive within the meaning of
the sixth amendment are not excluded. 98
96 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975) (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac.
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). The impartiality ofjuries
may be compromised, of course, if distinctive groups are excluded and with them
"qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience" that "may have
unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented." Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.
493, 503-04 (1972) (allowing a white defendant to complain that blacks had been
excluded from grand and petit juries); see Weisbrod, Images of the Woman Juror, 9
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59 (1986) (discussing the significance of gender to perceptions
of morality). In cases like Peters, which involved the exclusion of blacks, and Taylor,
in which the Court initially held that women constitute a distinctive group, this point
has self-evident validity. My focus, again, is on all citizens' right to be treated as
equals-and the threat to that principle when judicial authority is distributed without
regard for groups toward which the powerful are hostile.
"I It seems plain that the insistence upon including distinctive groups flows not
from any desire to impose upon those groups the burdens associated with jury service
but to ensure that the members of distinctive groups enjoy the "privilege of par-
ticipating equally ... in the administration of justice." Peters, 407 U.S. at 499; see
Note, Lockhart v. McCree: Death Qualification as a Determinant of the Impartiality
and Representativeness of a Jury in Death Penalty Cases, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1075,
1080 (1987) (showing that the cross-section requirement was developed to assure the
participation of blacks on juries).
"8 This covers the groups I have identified: racial, ethnic, and language
minorities-together with women. The sixth amendment cases have also found
people identified by occupation or education to be constitutionally distinctive. See,
e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946) (forbidding the exclusion of
daily wage earners); United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 571 (1st Cir. 1970)
(demanding an explanation for the exclusion of the less educated); see Magid,
Challenges to Jury Composition: Purging the Sixth Amendment Analysis of Equal
Protection Concepts, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1081, 1107-08 (1987) (collecting these
and other cases). In the context of judicial selection, however, "qualifications" may
validly be considered. See infra Part IV(B)(I). Age classifications present a border-
line case. The weight of authority holds that "young adults" do not constitute a
distinctive group for sixth amendment purposes. Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 682
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The jury trial cases are also helpful in fixing the scope of the constitutional
standard for judicial elections. A jury selection scheme meets constitutional
standards if it produces a venire that reflects a cross-section of the commu-
nity.99 An election scheme is similarly valid if it does not exclude members of
distinctive groups from the pool from which judges are taken. It may happen
that the number of judges actually elected from such groups is not propor-
tionate to the size of the groups in the community-much in the way that a
single petit jury may not include members of groups represented in the
community and in the venire.' 00 Nevertheless, an electoral scheme that
repeatedly fails to place candidates from distinctive groups on the bench is,
of course, ripe for close examination to determine the true reason for its
existence.'°'
Of course, candidates from distinctive groups may suffer systematically at
the polls not only because the election scheme in which they participate is
flawed but because individual voters take distinguishing characteristics into
account in voting. Yet we do not hold government officials to account
constitutionally for prejudices in the public at large. Instead, we typically
approach the racially determined voting problem at the flank, making bloc
voting a trigger for forcing government officials to make adjustments in
(6th Cir. 1988) (collecting illustrative precedents). One may fairly argue that the
routine exclusion of relatively youthful men and women from the bench would
invoke the kind of constitutional concerns we have in mind here. Yet, I am content
that schemes fixing specific age limits that exclude only the very young can pass
muster as establishing reasonable "experience" standards. See infra Part IV(B)(1).
In Ford, for example, the group in issue was composed of persons aged 18 to 29.
While the resulting restriction of jurors (and by analogy judges) to candidates "over
thirty" gives some initial pause to members of my generation, I confess I am more
comfortable now than I once was with the notion that age and experience do not
always skew one's values for the worse.
19 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-75 (1986).
100 The analogy between jury selection schemes and judicial elections is flawed in
this respect. In the one, the appearance of minorities on a panel is subject to
statistical prediction, and if, for example, too few women are selected over time, a
constitutional objection is immediately apparent. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357, 366-67 (1979) (invoking statistics to show that women were systematically
excluded from jury pools). In the other, candidates are exposed to the predilections
of the electorate.
101 1 have not engaged familiar arguments regarding the extent to which evidence
of the discriminatory effects of governmental policies demonstrates a purpose to
mistreat the victim class. Indeed, I have suggested that the Voting Rights Act should
readily be called into service in judicial elections without pausing over its departures
from baseline constitutional principle. Suffice it to say that any serious attempt to
enforce the Constitution in this context would at least embrace existing means of
discovering a refusal to treat some citizens as equals-and would probably press
governmental authorities harder on why it is, if it is, that members of distinctive
groups are not elected.
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something for which they are responsible-the electoral process. This is the
way in which we cope, or attempt to cope, with bigotry in the polling booth
when executive and legislative candidates stand for office. It is also the way
in which we should enforce, or attempt to enforce, constitutional require-
ments for the election of judges. Apart from the abandonment of judicial
elections, a course I would certainly approve but cannot insist is constitu-
tionally mandated, there is no other choice. 102
2. Judicial Appointments
In jurisdictions in which judges are appointed, including the federal sys-
tem, the constitutional requirement that judicial selection must accord equal
102 Our inability effectively to deal in substance With racisfff fthe p"bls may Argue
for abandonment of judicial elections in favor of appointive schemes more suscepti-
ble to constitutional review. But two points. First, there is a respectable body of
opinion to the effect that minority judges are more likely to be selected in the South
by the election schemes still in use there, at least so long as those schemes are
tempered by the procedural adjustments discussed in the text. There is a spirited
debate in civil rights circles regarding the extent to which the interests of black
people may best be served: (1) by retaining judicial elections in hopes that blacks,
aided by the Voting Rights Act, may be able to elect black judges; or (2) by pursuing
reform schemes under which appointive authorities, who are increasingly responsive
to the black electorate, put more blacks on the bench. Compare Mumford, Impartial
Justice Comes First When Selecting Judges, Jackson Clarion-Ledger Daily News,
Mar. 29, 1987, H-1 (advocating adoption of an appointive scheme in Mississippi) with
State Judge Challenges May Be Next Voting Frontier, VoTING RTS. REv. I (May,
1987) (indicating support for litigators attempting to invoke the Voting Rights Act in
judicial elections) and Coalition of Concerned Black Americans, A Preliminary
Report of the Experiences of the Minority Judiciary in the City of New York, 18 How.
L.J. 495, 503 (1975) (reporting that black and hispanic judges in New York "may very
well be in support of an elective system"). See generally Nat'l Law J., Feb. 20, 1989,
at 1, col. 1-2. It makes good sense that those whose objective is to advance the
interests of African Americans should seriously consider whether properly orches-
trated elections might be a more effective vehicle than schemes leaving the choice to
whites already in executive office.
Second, laying aside the practicalities of eliminating judicial elections, the theory
offered to justify change may prove too much to handle. The fatal flaw in judicial
elections (the bigotry of individual voters who routinely support white males and
ignore candidates from constitutionally distinctive groups) is repeated in all other
elections, in which executive and legislative officers are chosen. We may have the
luxury in the context of judicial selection to prefer appointive schemes over elec-
tions, but it can no more be claimed that the election of judges is itself unconstitu-
tional than it can seriously be argued that the election of county supervisors, mayors,
and governors is similarly invalid. But see Redish & Marshall, supra note 38. At some
point in a democracy, moreover, the Constitution must actually command
elections-even when many participants may vote their prejudices. But cf. Gillette,
Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86
MICH. L. REv. 930 (1988) (contending that individual participants in plebiscites are
unlikely to ignore the interests and concerns of others).
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concern and respect to citizens from distinctive groups controls both the
nomination of candidates (typically the executive's assignment) and the
approval of nominees (typically a legislative body's assignment). The presi-
dent or a governor cannot exclude from consideration members of groups to
which she or he is hostile. Nor can the Senate or an analogous state body
approve nominees chosen in that way. While the number of distinctive group
judges actually seated may not be proportional to the relevant group's
population in the community, the Constitution mandates that the nomination
and approval machinery provide the opportunity for members of all such
groups to be selected.10 3
In the case of judicial appointments, however, the prohibition on
exclusionary policies is insufficient to ensure conformity with the Constitu-
tion. Unlike election systems, in which aspiring candidates can be counted
upon to reveal their availability to the public, appointment schemes depend
on the executive's efforts to develop a list of potential judges. It is too easy
for insensitive presidents or governors to miscast their nets and thus miss
candidates from distinctive groups. If that should occur, it is unrealistic to
think that other participants in the appointment apparatus, namely legisla-
tive bodies with authority to pass on nominations, or even reviewing courts,
could catch the executive's constitutional wrong. Lacking the facilities nec-
essary to discover candidates omitted from the list, they would almost
certainly accept the executive's assurances that distinctive groups were not
neglected. Accordingly, another procedural safeguard against discrimina-
tory selection is constitutionally mandated-one that substitutes, in effect,
for the check supplied in election schemes by candidates' opportunity to file
for office.
Here again, the constitutional standards we are developing can fruitfully
borrow from an adjacent field. The challenge at hand is to fashion a mecha-
nism for identifying judicial candidates from constitutionally distinctive
groups that may otherwise be neglected. That same difficulty arises in
employment cases, in which ordinary solicitations habitually fail to generate
applications from minority workers. In that context, of course, we have
,developed a range of techniques, coming under the "affirmative action"
title, which promise a more thorough search for talent.104 If the constitu-
tional requirement that the equality of distinctive groups be respected is to
be taken seriously, similar efforts are essential in judicial appointment sys-
tems. There is nothing so startling in this. President Carter made affirmative
action an integral part of his innovative scheme for nominating candidates
103 In many appointment schemes, the executive is aided by a nominating commis-
sion. The same constitutional standards attach to the work of such commissions; they
require no separate attention.
104 I refer here only to special efforts to identify and attract minority candidates
and not to more controversial attempts to hire more such workers by taking their
status into account in making substantive decisions.
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for the circuit courts of appeal.105 It appears, however, that Carter did not
pause to wonder whether he was constitutionally obligated to do so."°6
The claim that appointive authorities must establish special plans for the
recruitment of judicial candidates from distinctive groups is open to the
objection that it mistakes what may be an appropriate backward-looking
105 Exec. Order No. 11972, 42 Fed. Reg. 9659 (1977) (establishing the U.S. Circuit
Judge Nominating Commission); Exec. Order 12059, 43 Fed. Reg. 20949, 20950
(1978) (specifying that the Commission should seek out qualified women and mem-
bers of minority groups as potential judicial nominees). Carter was also explicit on
the issue when he signed the Omnibus Judgeship Bill later in his term: "This act
provides a unique opportunity to redress . . . [a] disturbing feature of the Federal
Judiciary: the almost complete absence of women or members of minority groups."
Appointments of Additional District and Circuit Judges, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1803 (Oct. 23, 1978).
This is not to say that the particulars of Carter's plan meet or in any way establish
the constitutional standard. Indeed, there is reason to doubt that the mechanism he
developed was adequate to its task. At the outset, for example, Attorney General
Bell insisted upon naming prominent white male lawyers with whom he was person-
ally acquainted to chair the Commission's panels in each judicial circuit. While
minority and women's organizations were asked to suggest candidates for member-
ship on the panels, very few of those proposed were accepted. Instead, the panels
were staffed primarily by lawyers and active members of the president's party. In
operation, the panels often failed to solicit names from minority communities with
the necessary vigor. Votes on names to be submitted to the president, moreover,
were sometimes taken by secret ballot-thus allowing panelists to slight the Com-
mission's stated criteria and to support personal choices instead. At least initially, the
panels rarely recommended minority and women candidates. Nevertheless, all the
panels included minority members; in some instances, women were in the majority.
And there is no doubting that, in the end, the Commission generated many more
candidates from constitutionally distinctive groups than had any nominating proce-
dure in the past.
President Carter deserves enormous credit for nominating women to circuit judge-
ships at the rate of 41% and for nominating minorities at the rate of 47%. L. BERKSON
& S. CARBON, FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRA-
TION, VOL. I: THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS
MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES 41, 44, 66, 120, 143, 152 (1979); see also
L. BERKSON, S. CARBON & A. NEFF, A STUDY OF THE U.S. CIRCUIT JUDGE
NOMINATING COMMISSION: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 23 (1979) (pointing out that at the
time of Carter's inauguration only one of 97 active federal circuit judges was a woman
and that the new president named seven more within three years). Of course, other
presidents have also tried to diversify the judiciary. Cf. N. MCFEELEY, APPOINT-
MENT OF JUDGES: THE JOHNSON PRESIDENCY 136 (1987) (reporting that President
Johnson "attempted" to appoint women and minorities to the federal bench); N.Y.
Times, Oct. 31, 1987, at 1, 32, col. I (reporting that President Reagan's advisors
discussed the likelihood that Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg's being Jewish would
enhance his chances of confirmation).
106 He was.
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remedy for an affirmative constitutional mandate. Concededly, the race-
conscious schemes about which courts have been concerned in recent years
have been remedial in nature. 0 Yet when governmental action commonly
produces results inconsistent with what would be anticipated if only legiti-
mate objectives were in view, the absence of efforts to reach more deeply
into the population is plainly evidence that, in truth, impermissible attitudes
are at work.10 8 The difference between schemes that mistreat a constitution-
ally distinctive group and schemes that merely fail to avoid mistreatment is
often paper thin. And when the selection of the judges who will make future
constitutional judgments hangs in the balance, it is not too much to propose
that those in power give solid assurances that constitutional standards are
met.
The structural framework within which judicial appointments are made
offers further justification for demanding a selectioh process that identifies
candidates from distinctive groups. For example, the Senate's authority to
veto presidential nominations for the Supreme Court provides an occasion
for the Senate to ask the president to demonstrate the validity of the nomina-
tion process in advance of Senate action. If the Senate wishes to demand
that the president employ nomination procedures that actually produce the
names of minorities and women, there is no constitutional impediment and
much constitutional warrant for refusing to consider nominations developed
in any other manner. 109 This point, of course, puts pressure on any assumed
distinction between the president's constitutional obligations standing alone
and the executive's, practical, political tasks in light of Senate demands.
Given the Senate's constitutional role in Supreme Court appointments, the
significance of any such distinction is elusive. I will return to this theme in
Part V, when I take up the enforcement of constitutional standards for the
selection of judges.
B. Substantive Standards
I turn now to substantive standards for judicial selection, that is, standards
guiding the inquiries that must be made regarding individual candidates once
they have been identified consistent with the procedural standards just
107 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A, Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (invalidat-
ing a local "set aside" plan for minority contractors); United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149 (1987) (affirming a remedial promotion plan); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (invalidating a remedial layoff program).
108 Cf. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(explaining that a statistical imbalance can be evidence of purposeful race discrimina-
tion); International Bros. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 & n.20
(1977) (discussing the probative significance of statistical evidence as a tell-tale sign
of purposeful discrimination in violation of Title VII).
10I Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 449 U.S. 448, 449 (1980) (approving a con-
gressionally enacted "set aside" plan).
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discussed.1 ' Three broad headings capture most of the questions that arise:
(1) the ostensibly unexceptional matter of candidates' "qualifications" for
judicial office; (2) the extraordinarily controversial business of assessing
candidates on the basis of predictions regarding their positions on particular
legal issues; (3) the role of candidates' ideological make-up as a factor in
judicial selection. These matters bear on the election of candidates as well as
on the nomination and approval of candidates in appointive schemes. They
also bear on both candidates' selection and their rejection-at the polls or by
potential nominating authorities or oversight bodies. Nonetheless, in devel-
oping the substantive constitutional standards that must be respected in the
evaluation ofjudicial candidates, I treat appointive schemes as the norm and
characterize factors in the negative-as valid bases for refusing to place
candidates on the bench.'
1
'
110 In at least one respect, there is the potential for tension between what I call
procedural and substantive standards. On the one hand, I have argued that judicial
selection schemes are procedurally flawed if they fail to take account of the interests
of all citizens. In particular, I have maintained that members of constitutionally
distinctive groups must be accorded a fair opportunity to be chosen as judges. In this
Section, on the other hand, I insist that some points of view held by judicial
candidates disqualify them from service on the bench. Yet, to the extent citizens who
hold such disqualifying views are ignored in the selection process, and certainly to
the extent the set they comprise can be assimilated to something constitutionally
distinctive, the enforcement of substantive standards appears to run full tilt into the
procedural standards I have just outlined. The budding conflict is inconsiderable,
however. Procedural constitutional standards can hardly provide a vehicle for frus-
trating substantive standards. Would-be judges who hold disqualifying ideologies are
not distinctive in the constitutional sense I mean. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162, 176 (1986) (declining to consider "groups defined solely in terms of shared
attitudes" to be "distinctive" for purposes of a criminal defendant's right to trial by a
jury chosen from a fair cross-section of the community); cf. Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981) (finding no establishment clause violation in a benefit to which
citizens were entitled under the free exercise clause). The point of excluding candi-
dates with certain views from the judiciary is that such exclusions can and, indeed,
must be enforced-constitutionally. The point of giving special attention to members
of "constitutionally distinctive" groups is that such groups, defined in the equal
protection and trial-by-jury contexts, are the most likely to be barred from power by
unchecked majoritarianism. All this said, I would defend the interrogation of Judge
Daniel A. Manion regarding his relations, if any, with the John Birch Society. See
Confirmation Hearing on Daniel E. Manion: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary on Appointments to the Federal Judiciary and the Department of
Justice, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 229-35 (1986); cf. Nomination of Felix Frankfurter:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomina-
tion of Felix Frankfurter to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 108-11 (1939) (reporting questions put to Frankfurter regarding his
affiliation with the American Civil Liberties Union).
"I For a discussion of standards to be considered by the public in evaluating
judicial candidates in retention elections, see Thompson, Judicial Independence,
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1. Judicial "Qualifications"
Formal qualifications for judicial office fixed by law invariably cover no
more than age, citizenship, domicile, and experience." 2 From that baseline,
the American Bar Association advances only to the suggestion that judges
should be "persons of integrity, competence, and suitable temperament.' "13
Appearances necessitate that those with authority to name judges proclaim
that their chief criteria are "merit" and "quality."'1 14 Yet the genuine con-
tent of these "qualifications" begs for explanation. After a less-than-
scientific thumbing of available materials, I offer this check list of the
matters into which appointive authorities are commonly urged to inquire:
integrity, intelligence, education, experience, stamina, temperament, and
competence.
Judicial Accountability, Judicial Elections, and the California Supreme Court: De-
fining the Terms of the Debate, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 812 (1986).
112 See generally L. BERKSON, S. BELLER & M. GRIMALDI, JUDICIAL SELECTION
IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS (1980). But see Mathias,
Advice and Consent: The Role of the United States Senate in the Judicial Selection
Process, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 200, 201 (1987) (recalling that the Constitution includes
no such formal requisites).
I do not address in this discussion the requirement that judges be disinterested in
the subject of particular cases. Bias and prejudice at that level are the stuff of rules
governing the disqualification of sitting judges. Of course, there is a relationship
between appropriate standards of impartiality in individual cases and standards for
judicial selection in the first instance. Cf. Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge
Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 257-59 (1987) (arguing that ajudge's racial
prejudice should disqualify him or her in a case in which race is a factor); see also
Resnik, supra note 90 (suggesting from a feminist point of view that the very idea of
impartiality is flawed and that a new perspective on disengagement is needed with
respect to both judicial selection and disqualification).
113 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 8-6 (1986). Essayists
contribute lists of admirable attributes. See, e.g., Rosenberg, The Qualities of Jus-
tices-Are They Strainable?, in JUDICIAL SELECTION 1, supra note 36. Aristotle
demanded four virtues in judges: justice, temperance, prudence, and fortitude. Aris-
totle, Ethics, in 9 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, bk. 5, ch. 4 (W.D. Ross trans. 1925),
cited in Noonan, Education, Intelligence, and Character in Judges, 71 MINN. L.
REV. 1119, 1127 (1987); see also Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1184, 1199 (1988) (proposing that candidates for the Supreme Court should exhibit the
"right moral instincts"); A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT
SELECTION 61-63 (1974) (reporting that mental and physical health are important
criteria of selection), quoted in P. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 14 (1980).
"' See, e.g., Attorney General's Memorandum on Judicial Selection Procedures,
March 6, 1981, reprinted in Stiegler, Selecting Federal Judges During the Reagan
Administration, 64 JUDICATURE 427, 428 (1981) (insisting that the Attorney General
and Senate leadership were committed to evaluating federal judges on the basis of
merit and quality).
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The first five present no serious question-practical or constitutional.
Dishonest, dense, poorly-educated, inexperienced, sickly men and women
may well make poor judges. On this we can agree on the whole, albeit some
of us would regard want of a law degree or substantial experience in legal
practice rather less egregious than other liabilities." 5 Of course, the weight
these factors should be given and their implication for individual candidates
are potentially controversial matters.1 6 It is sufficient nonetheless to say
. See Noonan, supra note 113, at 1122-24 (recalling that some of our most
respected jurists did well enough without formal legal education). Fred Schauer may
well be right. Judges require technical competence primarily in order to keep "easy"
cases out of the courts altogether. When they are asked to decide difficult cases that
genuinely can lay claim to judicial resolution, judges need something quite
different-" skills, perspectives [and] talents" that may be found as readily in non-
lawyers. Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1732
(1988).
While President Carter's female and minority nominees tended to be less experi-
enced than his white male nominees, the hard data make it "difficult, if not impossi-
ble" to contend that Carter's affirmative action policy diluted the "quality" of the
federal bench. Slotnick, Lowering the Bench or Raising it Higher? Affirmative Action
and Judicial Selection During the Carter Administration, 1 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
270, 297 (1983); Goldman, Should There be Affirmative Action for the Judiciary? 62
JUDICATURE 488, 492-93 (1979) (listing many eminent minority and female judges
brought to the bench in part because of affirmative action); cf. Bartholet, Application
of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1982) (contending that
affirmative action can fruitfully be invoked in filling upper level positions).
'" In Judge Haynsworth's case, for example, opinions were divided over the
nature and extent of the nominee's relations with a company doing business with a
firm involved in litigation before him and, more important, over the significance of
those alleged relations for the confirmation question. Compare Clement F.
Haynsworth Jr.: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomina-
tion of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 489 (1969) [hereinafter Haynsworth
Hearings] (testimony of William Pollock, President, Textile Workers of America)
charging that Judge Haynsworth had significant financial interests in the company)
with Haynsworth Hearings, supra, at 38 (statement of Senator Hollings) (insisting
that Haynsworth's interests in the firm were "remote"). Justice Brandeis's nomina-
tion is the most famous illustration of senatorial inquiry into the "integrity" issue in
the face of conflicting testimony. See generally Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis:
Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Louis D.
Brandeis to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 64th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1916).
Judgments regarding the significance of these questions may also vary according to
the kind of court candidates hope to serve. See Jones, The Trial Judge-Role
Analysis and Profile, in THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 124,
140 (1965) (discussing the requirements for being a trial judge); SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, NOMINATION OF GEORGE HARROLD CARSWELL, S. EXEC. REP. No.
14, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970) [hereinafter CARSWELL NOMINATION] (Senators
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that shortcomings in these terms can and should be disqualifying without
resort to the Constitution. So long as such standards are reasonably stated
and applied, and do not mask illegitimate goals, they are valid." 7
The notion that candidates should manifest a "judicial temperament" is
more unruly. On the one hand, "temperament" may refer to "prudence""' 8
or Solomanic justice. 119 If either of these captures the meaning of judicial
temperament, then it will be revealed through inquiries into such things as
integrity and experience. At any rate, such personality traits as these,
however important they may be for success on the bench, do not ignite
constitutional concerns. If, on the other hand, temperament refers to the
capacity and inclination to treat litigants as equals, and in a broader sense to
keep the morally equivalent interests of all citizens in view as legal para-
phernalia are interpreted, then candidates who lack judicial temperament are




Bayh, Hart, Kennedy, and Tydings) (contending that Judge Carswell's record failed
to manifest such "achievement and eminence" to warrant his being seated on the
nation's highest tribunal).
"7 See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
118 See Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567,
1569 (1985); cf. Gavison, The Implications of Jurisprudential Theories for Judicial
Election, Selection and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1617, 1650-55 (1988)
(suggesting that judicial qualifications should take account of the value choices that
judges will be called upon to make).
119 See D. JACKSON, JUDGES 7 (1974) (crediting Geoffrey Hazard with the refer-
ence).
120 While Judge Carswell's detractors typically focused on whether he was compe-
tent for service on the Supreme Court, some critics faulted him for lacking "judicial
temperament" and meant by that that he was hostile to litigation on behalf of racial
minorities. See CARSWELL NOMINATION, supra note 116, at 17. Similarly, Judge
Bork was challenged for an alleged insensitivity on racial issues. Compare A.F.L.-
C.I.O. Vows to Oppose Bork Nomination, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1987, at A16, col. 1
(quoting a labor union statement charging that Judge Bork had "never shown the
least concern for working people, minorities, the poor") with Bork Says He Left
Club that Barred Women, Boston Globe, Aug. 11, 1987, at 10, col. 4 (reporting that
Judge Bork claimed to have signed a petition supporting the admission of women to
membership in New York's Century Association and to have resigned when he
learned that the Association's males-only policy might violate state law).
121 The Senate has occasionally rejected nominees for the federal bench at least in
part in response to concerns about their respect for racial minorities. The most
famous case may be the struggle over President Hoover's nomination of Judge John
J. Parker. NAACP Secretary Walter White expressed his organization's outrage that
Parker had made explicitly racist statements in a speech before the Republican state
convention in North Carolina. See Confirmation of Hon. John J. Parker to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Confirmation of Hon. John J. Par-
ker to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 71st
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Professional "competence" is more refractory still. Apart from candi-
dates' education, experience, and temperament, their competence bespeaks
expertise in handling legal materials-in finding relevant statutes and prece-
dents, in deciphering their esoteric language, and in bringing written rules to
bear on current problems. There is more in this than a merely conservative
notion of appropriate judicial behavior. This is the technician model.122
Judges, to be sure, require these common skills if they are to perform well,
and candidates may therefore be examined to ensure that they grasp the
rudiments of legal practice. If, however, appointive authorities look upon
candidates' technical skills as not merely necessary but also as sufficient,
they engage grave constitutional risks. The law with which judges must
grapple is not a matter of "fact," such that courts need only discover "what
legal institutions have decided in the past."' 2 3 In constitutional cases, judges
examine legislative and executive actions in light of our commitment to
equality, distilled from our cultural vision of the public good. To consider
only technical competence is to ignore the constitutional command under
which judges labor as they interpret legal materials in this constitutional
democracy.
124
Cong., 2d Sess. 74.(1930) (statement of Walter White). Despite that record, it appears
that Parker's defeat was due in large part to opposition from organized labor on other
grounds. See Dubois, The Defeat of Judge Parker, 37 CRIsIs 225, 248 (1930)
(ascribing Parker's failure to a new "union of forces" between liberals and labor
unions on the one hand and blacks on the other); see Lively, The Supreme Court
Appointment Process: In Search of Constitutional Roles and Responsibilities, 59 S.
CAL. L. REV. 551, 567-72 (1986) (tracing Parker's subsequent career as a circuit
judge-and identifying evidence that he was, indeed, insensitive to racial minorities).
Plainly, the Senate has recently conducted searching investigations of nominees
suspected of antagonism to racial minorities. See, e.g., Nomination of Jefferson B.
Sessions III, to be U.S. District Judge.for the Southern District of Alabama: Hear-
ings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Jefferson B.
Sessions III, of Alabama, to be U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of
Alabama, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987) (containing several statements and exchanges
in which the candidate's attitudes regarding blacks were explored). Of course,
criticisms of Chief Justice Rehnquist's alleged harassment of minority voters in
Arizona, and his notorious memorandum to Justice Jackson concerning school
segregation, have received widespread attention. See SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, NOMINATION OF WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, S. EXEC. REP. No. 16, 92d
Cong., I st Sess. 24-25 (1971) (explaining the views of Senators Bayh, Hart, Kennedy,
and Tunney).
122 See, e.g., Garwood, Democracy and the Popular Election of Judges: An
Argument, 16 Sw. L.J. 216, 229 (1962) (arguing that judges, like admirals and
university presidents, are experts).
12' LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 8, at 31.
124 A distinction is commonly drawn in this connection between judges who sit on
courts of last resort, particularly justices of the United States Supreme Court, and
lower court judges. It is, true that judges who are infallible because they are last and
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2. Issue-Regarding Predictions
Candidates for judicial office since Frankfurter have routinely declined to
discuss their likely positions on particular legal issues-at least in public.' 25
Officials in a position to influence appointments have indulged this reticence,
at least in public, for two ostensible reasons.' 26 First, inquiries into candi-
dates' predictable votes in hypothetical cases may threaten the indepen-
dence of the judiciary. Appointive authorities, who occupy positions in
either the executive or legislative branches, overreach their proper spheres if
they attempt to influence outcomes in disputes before the judicial branch by
conditioning the appointment of candidates on promises to cooperate in
who have great flexibility in correcting their own past "errors" fit more precisely the
model described in the text than do inferior court judges constrained to adhere to
precedents handed down from above. Yet the extent to which lower courts are
genuinely bound by higher court precedents in close cases may be overstated. Only
rarely is a precedent truly on "all fours" with the case at bar, and more rarely still
can the lower court anticipate that its decision will be reviewed-given the physical
limits of most appellate courts. Indeed, there is ample evidence that lower court
judges feel free to treat precedents as merely elements of the rich mix of materials
that must be considered in resolving a new dispute. The resulting state of affairs may
be objectionable to some, unsettling to .nany, but it seems only consistent with the
nature of judicial behavior.
125 Cf. Nomination of Felix Frankfurter: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Felix Frankfurter to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 107 (1939) (insisting
that responses to questions about substantive issues would promote neither the
interests of the nomination process nor the Court).
126 See, e.g., Bork Says He Left Club that Barred Women, Boston Globe, Aug. 11,
1987, at 10, col. 4 (reporting Judge Bork's insistence that President Reagan's advisors
had not asked about his position on "any case or legal issue or question" that could
come before the Court). But cf. Roberts, Reagan Gets His Chance to Tilt the Court,
N.Y. Times, June 28, 1987, § 4, at 1, col. I (quoting Senator Leahy accusing
President Reagan of attempting to "change" the Court's position on abortion and a
range of other vexing issues). During the hearings on Justice Stewart's nomination,
Senator Hennings attempted to forestall questions about Supreme Court precedents
by raising a point of order. Senator Eastland overruled that idea in favor of leaving it
to the nominee to decide whether to answer such questions. That, of course, is now
the accepted rule. See Powe, The Senate and the Court: Questioning a Nominee, 54
TEX. L. REV. 891, 892 (1976). Yet some senators occasionally persist. The most
notorious example is the extensive questionnaire that Senators John East and
Jeremiah Denton sent to Andrew L. Frey, a nominee for the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See D. O'BRIEN, supra note 22, at
107-11; see also Wermiel, Bork's Abortion Views Looming Larger As Problem in
High Court Confirmation, Wall St. J., July 6, 1987, at 2, col. 1 (reporting that Senator
Packwood threatened to filibuster the Bork nomination if Judge Bork declined to
support precedents invalidating state statutes restricting abortion).
1989]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69: 273
controversial cases. 27 Second, candidates and appointive authorities may
wish to avoid prejudging issues. Projected views would necessarily be
abstracted from actual disputes in which the relevant legal issues might arise
and thus would forfeit the benefits of concrete fact patterns, careful briefing,
and, on multi-judge courts, collegial deliberations. By this account, judges
perform best when they are faced with practical circumstances that establish
the field in which legal principles operate-now narrowing, then extending,
the scope of the judicial lawmaking required.128 In a similar vein, effective
advocacy and informal consultations with colleagues also promise a better
brand of judicial action.1 29 Finally, candidates for the bench may reasonably
wish to avoid public statements they may have to withdraw when, in the
light of argument in actual cases, they change their minds.
These explanations sound familiar constitutional themes-" separation of
powers" and the confinement of (federal) courts to genuine "cases or con-
troversies. ' ' 30 Yet on close examination neither explanation justifies the
common hesitancy to press candidates on their views about legal questions.
The threat to judicial independence would be real if, in fact, authorities in the
other branches could routinely use their roles in the judicial selection pro-
cess to control the future course of constitutional law.' 3' The great range of
issues presented to courts, however, together with the length of a judge's
7 Cfi: United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872) (apparently standing
inter alia for the proposition that Congress cannot specify the outcomes to be
reached by federal courts considering legal questions).
128 See Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 303-04 (1979) (arguing that
judicial decisionmaking should be limited to the legal questions necessary to the
resolution of a dispute).
121, Id. at 311-12 (extolling the virtues of advocacy by interested parties). See
generally Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 42 (arguing that collective decisionmaking
can improve a court's performance).
130 When Justice Fortas returned to the Senate Judiciary Committee for hearings
on his nomination to succeed Earl Warren as Chief Justice, he made the separa-
tion-of-powers point explicitly in response to Senator Thurmond's questions re-
garding Warren Court precedents. With respect to cases in which he himself had
participated, Fortas insisted that federal judges, like members of Congress protected
by the speech and debate clause, should not be questioned about their behavior on
the bench "in any other place." Nominations of Abe Fortas and Homer Thornberry:
Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Abe
Fortas, of Tennessee, to be Chief Justice of the United States and Nomination of
Homer Thornberry, of Texas, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1968) [hereinafter Fortas and Thornberry
Hearings]; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. But see Note, Must a Supreme Court Justice
Refuse to Answer Senators' Questions?, 78 YALEL.J. 696 (1969) (faulting these
explanations for Fortas's failure to answer questions).
3' Cf. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting bills of attainder).
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tenure on the bench, render that prospect unlikely. 132 On the whole, in-
quiries into candidates' own predictions of their positions in hypothetical
cases may be reconciled with appointive authorities' entirely appropriate
exploration of ideological outlook, to which I will turn in a moment. Indeed,
and in this I do not mean to be unsympathetic, the real reason that judicial
candidates may wish to avoid such inquiries is that they fear public embar-
rassment should their answers reveal ignorance or sloppy thinking-
however understandable in the circumstances.1 33 The notion that potential
judges require concrete disputes, argument, and collegial deliberations be-
fore giving their views may also be overdone. The issues about which
candidates are most likely to be asked have typically arisen in actual cases in
the past (providing the necessary factual backdrop) and have been debated
in various professional and public circles for years." 4 To pick from common
illustrations, it strains credulity to suggest that presidential nominees for the
Supreme Court need these trappings of the judicial craft before discussing
their views on the validity of state-sponsored racial segregation or blanket
criminal penalties on abortion.135
There is, however, another, decidedly constitutional, explanation for the
hesitancy to broach candidates' own expectations of their positions on legal
issues. The notion of selecting judges because they are inclined to decide
cases as the faction in power wishes bespeaks the representational model.
132 Professor Friedman has argued that it is impossible to predict a judge's long-
term ideological views from her ideology at the time of her nomination. See Fried-
man, Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominations,
91 YALE L.J. 1283, 1291 (1986).
113 It should be recalled that the justices of the Supreme Court participate in the
formulation of the federal rules and thus apparently approve the constitutionality of
amendments. No one seriously proposes that it would be particularly embarrassing
thereafter, in a concrete case, for the Court to find a constitutional difficulty not
detected when a rule was promulgated.
131 See, e.g., Fortas and Thornberry Hearings, supra note 130, at 181 (reporting
questions put to Abe Fortas by Senator Thurmond).
135 For example, Judge Bork's widely known views on these issues generated
fierce opposition from civil rights and abortion rights groups and played a critical role
in the confirmation hearings. See Rosenthal, Bork Fight Gives Abortion Rights
Convention Something to Shout About, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1987, at A12, col. 1
(reporting that Bork's nomination enraged abortion rights advocates); Witcher,
NAACP Convention Tackles Bork, New Agenda, Boston Globe, July 12, 1987, at 3,
col. 1 (reporting NAACP opposition to Bork); Greenhouse, The Bork Nomination: In
No Time at All, Both Proponents and Opponents Are Ready for Battle, N.Y. Times,
July 9, 1987, at A24, col. I (reporting the speedy mobilization of Bork opponents and
supporters); Dionne, Abortion, Bork and the '88 Campaign, N.Y. Times, July 8,
1987, at A20, col. 1 (reporting on the political implications of Bork's views on
abortion). But see Nagel, A Comment on Democratic Constitutionalism, 61 TUL. L.
REv. 1027, 1032 (1987) (explaining that senators may hesitate to ask candidates about
their views for fear of appearing to be "politicizing the confirmation process").
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Even if it is assumed that a governor or president, elected by popular vote,
represents a majority of the citizenry,' 36 his or her majoritarian sentiments
may not be vindicated consistent with the Constitution without regard for
the equality of constitutionally distinctive groups. Simply put, judicial ap-
pointments are unconstitutional if made in furtherance of the appointing
authority's preferences alone. This is not to say that isolated references to
candidates' opinions on debatable points of law are necessarily constitution-
ally damning. It is to say that an appointive authority's selection of particular
candidates for the purpose of obtaining judicial decisions that neglect the
constitutional requirement of equal concern and respect provides an occa-
sion not only for permissible political opposition but for mandatory constitu-
tional objection.
3. Ideology
The truly vexing question regarding substantive standards for judicial
selection is the role of candidates' "political philosophy" or "ideology." In
the main, the fuss seems to be about judicial candidates' perspective on the
world manifest in the values they carry about, the baggage of their per-
sonalities. 137 An individual's perspective in this sense is properly labeled
ideology-the kind of value-laden framework that each of us brings to bear
on the data of daily life as a means of interpreting evidence and making sense
of it.' 38 I will divide the discussion to follow into two parts: the permissibility
136 Of course, no one would indulge any such assumption but for purposes of
argument. The electoral college to one side, the president never enjoys the manifest
support of a majority of citizens and often lacks support from even a majority of
voters. More to the point, the mere election of any officer on the strength of
inscrutable voter behavior hardly demonstrates majority sentiment regarding any
single issue with which the officer deals.
137 One could attempt a distinction between candidates' general ideology and the
part of that world view that bears upon their potential behavior as judges. I am not
sure any such distinction can be drawn, such that anyone's perspective on the
judicial role can be discussed seriously apart from the more general mind-set I have
identified.
13' The popular literature slips loosely between the terms "political philosophy"
and "ideology," ignoring the implications of each. See, e.g., Johnston, Reagan to
Select Nominee for Court Within Two Weeks, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1987, at A14,
col. I (quoting Attorney General Meese denying that President Reagan would employ
an "ideological test" but conceding that the President would base his choice on
candidates' "view of the constitutional role of the judiciary"); see also J. SIMON, IN
His OWN IMAGE: THE SUPREME COURT IN RICHARD NIXON's AMERICA (1973)
(suggesting that President Nixon's nominees for the Supreme Court possessed simi-
lar political philosophies but very different judicial ideologies). I distinguish "poli-
tics," which concerns the competition for power, and "ideology," which touches
world view-a judgmental frame of reference that is not affected by accumulated
evidence but rather is pressed upon data by the interpreter. I do not refer to the
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of considering ideology in the selection of judges and the constitutional
responsibility on the part of appointive authorities to take ideology into
account.
The range of permissible reference to judicial candidates' ideology is
broad. It has been historically 13 9 and doubtless will be in the future14 0 -
without constitutional objection. Appointive authorities may routinely favor
members of their own political parties.14 1 In addition, they may and probably
should trim lists of would-be judges at the extremes, settling upon candidates
near the mainstream. Certainly in the federal system, the Constitution
contemplates much tugging and pulling at the level of ideology as the presi-
dent and the Senate spar with one another over the best choices to staff the
third branch of the national government. A shadow set of arrangements in
state systems can be expected and appreciated in a similar fashion. These
machinations can raise constitutional concerns, of course,'142 but the sub-
Marxian understanding of "ideology," which has the disparaging connotation of a
delusional set of beliefs that, when embraced by the masses, serves to maintain the
privileged status of those in control. In the sense I use the term "ideology" in the
text, it relates to everyone, wherever she or he is located with respect to the seat of
power.
139 H. ABRAHAM, supra note 22, at 157 (illustrating the way in which candidates'
ideology has historically played the most decisive role in the selection of federal
judges); Goldman, Judicial Appointments to the United States Courts of Appeals,
1967 Wis. L. REV. 186, 206 (commenting on the significance of ideological consid-
erations in the appointment of federal judges in the Eisenhower and Kennedy admin-
istrations).
140 Cf. Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary: The First Term Appointments, 68
JUDICATURE 313, 327 (1985) (describing President Reagan's effort to shift the ideolog-
ical balance of the lower federal courts through the appointment of more conserva-
tive judges); Note, supra note 12 (suggesting that President Reagan's centralized
control of judicial screening procedures enabled him to identify and nominate those
candidates with the most conservative ideologies); Wicker, Straight Talk on Bork,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1987, at A31, col. 3 (insisting that both the president and
Senate can be expected to take political positions respecting nominations to the
Supreme Court).
141 See Goldman, Judicial Backgrounds, Recruitment, and the Party Variable: The
Case of the Johnson and Nixon Appointees to the United States District and Appeals
Courts, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 211; cf. Goldman, Carter's Judicial Appointments: A
Lasting Legacy, 64 JUDICATURE 344, 348 (1981) (demonstrating that candidates'
party affiliation has consistently been an essential criterion in the appointment
process).
142 Thus ideological considerations cannot justify the refusal to consider Catholics
for the bench. See supra Part IV(A); cf. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 3 (barring a "religious
Test" as a qualification for an office of the United States). The distinction I mean to
draw between ideology that may be taken into account by appointive authorities, and
thus may be the basis for rejecting candidates, and ideology that must be considered
disqualifying constitutionally is not so clean as it may first appear. Whenever a
governor limits choice to members of his or her own party, something I concede may
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stantive constitutional standards I have suggested here are not offended by
the mere application of politics to the business of choosing judges. It is quite
plain, then, that appointive authorities may and should reject candidates on
ideological grounds.
The question whether such authorities must jettison some candidates
because of those candidates' perspectives on the world is more troublesome.
Some ideological positions disable candidates from service on the bench in
this constitutional democracy. The appointment of judges who hold those
views is therefore unconstitutional. I do not propose for a moment that this
constitutional prohibition tracks even roughly the path of permissible
grounds for rejecting candidates; far from it.1 43 The Constitution bars the
door only to judicial candidates whose ideology is at war with constitutional
democracy as we know it, as it has been developed, understood, and valued
in this political culture. The elements of that constitutional democracy can
be stated clearly, if they can be applied only with difficulty. Governmental
officers may not simply and selfishly advance the preferences of privileged
groups-even majorities-but rather must choose objectives for action in
the public interest. They must recognize the right of all citizens to be treated
as equals and thus must fashion policies with attention to the interests,
aspirations, and integrity of all. This is especially true with respect to
choosing the judges who are assigned the duty to enforce the Constitution on
a daily basis. Candidates who manifest disrespect for the equality of others
must, then, be rejected.
be done, it may be argued that candidates from an opposing party (and other citizens
who do not share the governor's party preference) are denied equal concern and
respect. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132-34 (1986) (wrestling with a
political gerrymandering claim); Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerryman-
dering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (1987)
(commenting on the decision in Davis to adjudicate claims of partisan gerrymander-
ing). The arid distinction between affirmative preference and negative mistreatment
cannot withstand scrutiny at the fringes and disintegrates entirely when the burdens
assumed by the disfavored become paramount, as in my hypothetical regarding
Catholics. Even if the relationship between permissible political considerations and
constitutionally proscribed procedures for judicial selection remains troubled, my
analysis of constitutionally mandated substantive criteria for judicial selection can
stand on its own. See supra note 110.
"I Cf. LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 8, at 87 (contemplating that judges may legiti-
mately disagree over the use to which the intentions of legislative drafters should be
put). While Ronald Dworkin opposed confirmation of Judge Bork because of Bork's
originalist position and disrespect for precedent, Dworkin did not put his arguments
in constitutional terms. See Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, N.Y. Review of Books,
Aug. 13, 1987, at 3, col. 1 (labeling Bork's style of decisionmaking radical and
antilegal). Dworkin, however, did interpret Bork's defeat as a vindication of his own
competing understanding of constitutionalism. Dworkin, From Bork to Kennedy,
N.Y. Review of Books, Dec. 17, 1987, at 36, col. 2.
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V. IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS
I come at last to the practical problem of enforcement, which no doubt
also contributes to our reluctance to recognize constitutional standards for
judicial selection. Lawyers may think immediately of judicial enforcement
and may balk at asking judges to police the way in which they themselves are
chosen. Sitting judges, moreover, may reasonably hesitate to pass judgment
on potential colleagues. If those hurdles are cleared, there will be other
problems: standing, ripeness, and appropriate relief. Judges' own doubts
about their role will, of course, influence the way in which these issues are
resolved. Then, too, the specter of self-appointed private attorneys general
haling appointive authorities into court to account for unpopular selections is
more than most lawyers, or legal academics, can contemplate with com-
fort.144
I do not discount the gravity of these problems, though it bears mention
that the corpus of technical rules governing the justiciability of constitutional
questions in article III courts is hardly something to boast about. 4 Rather
than projecting the kinds of concrete lawsuits that might be structured, I
want to explore the capacity of executive and legislative officers to fashion
other mechanisms to ensure that constitutional standards for judicial selec-
tion are met. To begin, the president and the various governors, who often
have authority to nominate or appoint judges, may simply respond to their
responsibility to enforce the Constitution by establishing appropriate proce-
dures for identifying candidates and excluding from consideration candi-
dates whose ideology renders them ineligible for judicial service. President
Carter's nominating commission was a fair start in the federal system;
similar schemes in place in many states are equally promising. 46 Executive
officers are sworn to uphold the Constitution and would do so in most
instances if relevant standards were agreed upon. While, again, we typically
look to judicial opinions in actual cases for authoritative guidance regarding
constitutional standards, there are other arenas in which the Constitution's
meaning must be articulated. If this were not so, we could make no sense at
14 See, e.g., Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (refusing to adjudicate a
challenge to Justice Black's appointment to the Supreme Court).
'41 See Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 COR-
NELL L. REV. 663 (1977) (arguing that the law of standing lacks4 rational foundation);
Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Juris-
prudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984) (suggesting that the Supreme Court
continually "misuses" the doctrines of standing and equitable restraint).
146 See L. BERKSON, S. BELLER & M. GRIMALDI, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS (1980) (providing illustrations).
Such nominating mechanisms can also produce names from constitutionally distinc-
tive groups. See Part IV(A).
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all of widely-recognized phenomena that rarely receive explicit judicial
elaboration.147
In addition to policing themselves, executive officers may enforce con-
stitutional standards in their dealings with other participants in the appoint-
ment process. For example, the president can and, if the Constitution is to
be respected, must refuse to nominate candidates recommended by senators
if the names of those candidates were generated by inadequate procedure. A
resolute president, indeed, might force senators to develop their own
nominating commissions in order to satisfy constitutional demands and thus
to win presidential cooperation.1 48 Stalemate is possible, of course, but
powerful incentives to arrive at agreement make accommodations consistent
with the Constitution irresistible in most instances.
The possibilities for legislative enforcement are, if anything, more abun-
dant.' 49 First, legislative bodies assigned by law to pass on nominees put
forward by the executive can refuse to approve any candidate chosen by a
'47 Executive privilege, for example. See Freund, The Supreme Court, 1973
Term-Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13 (1974) (discussing
the historical development of the privilege without Supreme Court approval); cf. R.
BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974) (suggesting that
the privilege has no foundation in the Constitution). But cf. United States v. Nixon,
22 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1974) (exploring the impact of the Nixon tapes decision).
I48 Some senators already employ screening commissions that could serve this
purpose. See A. NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING COM-
MISSIONS: THEIR MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES 65 (1981). President
Carter encouraged nominating panels for district court appointments, and many
senators who responded favorably maintained such panels even after President
Reagan rejected the nominating commission idea out of hand in favor of a more
traditional selection process managed by the Justice Department. See Note,
A Comparison of Initial Recommendation Procedures: Judicial Selection Under
Reagan and Carter, 1 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 299, 342 (1983) (disclosing that
some senators nevertheless continued to employ nominating commissions). But cf.
S. SUITTS, THE APPOINTMENT OF SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES: A STATUS REPORT
(1979) (reporting disappointing results from district court nominating commissions
established by some Southern senators under pressure from the Carter White
House).
149 Cf. Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975) (underscoring the obligation of legislatures to
determine the constitutionality of proposed legislation); Fisher, Constitutional In-
terpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.L. REV. 707 (1985) (discussing the
competence of Congress to play a role in shaping the meaning of the Constitution).
Indeed, there is reason to think that legislative bodies are positioned to give constitu-
tional principles more complete vindication than are courts, which, for a variety of
institutional reasons, may tend to check the reach of those standards. Sager, Fair
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1212, 1213 (1978) (describing the Supreme Court's failure to enforce constitu-
tional provisions to their fullest extent).
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constitutionally inadequate process or embracing ideological commitments
inconsistent with constitutional democracy. Again, the Senate provides an
illustration. To be sure, Hamilton warned that senators who reject a presi-
dential nominee for the Supreme Court must anticipate another candidate of
similar bent.'5 0 It is possible that the selection process could degenerate,
with a series of candidates suffering rejection seriatim. Still, if the Senate is
adamant, as it must be where the Constitution is concerned, the president
will at some point relent and put forward a nominee chosen by constitution-
ally acceptable means and holding constitutionally acceptable views. T5
It may be objected that the Senate's attempts to influence executive
choice in the federal system would run afoul of the separation of powers or
the appointments clause. The separation-of-powers principle is said to be
implicit in the constitutional structure (which confers primary responsibility
for the three functions of government upon three different branches) or
explicit in the specific assignment of functions to identified officials and
bodies. Thus it has been insisted that article II's injunction that the "execu-
tive Power shall be vested in a President" squarely prohibits the appoint-
ment of federal officers (conceived as an intrinsically executive function) by
anyone other than the president or his linear agents.'52 Yet neither the
overarching separation-of-powers idea nor the language of article II man-
dates any such formalism. Modern appraisals of constitutional structure and
150 THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (A. Hamilton). Recent experience indicates oth-
erwise. Disappointed that his first choice to succeed Justice Powell could not be
confirmed by the Senate, President Reagan initially insisted that he would propose
another candidate equally objectionable to his critics. See Reagan Vows New Ap-
pointment as Upsetting to His Foes asBork's, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1987, at A1, col.
3. In due course, however, Reagan nominated Judge Kennedy, whom most observers
considered to be manifestly less controversial.
1' See Bork Nomination to Court Weighed by the President, N.Y. Times, June 30,
1987, at Al, col. 1 (reporting that President Reagan's advisors sought informal advice
from senators regarding the likelihood that Judge Bork would be confirmed if nomi-
nated); White House Floats a Dozen Names for the High Court, N.Y. Times, July 1,
1987, at A16, col. 4 (reporting that White House officials presented a list of possible
candidates to Senate leaders to determine whether potential nominees were objec-
tionable).
152 See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 9-10, 44-46, Morrison v. Olson, 108
S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (amicus curiae supporting appellees) (pertaining to the appointment
of an independent counsel); cf. Springer v. Government of the Phillipine Islands, 277
U.S. 189 (1928) (involving statutory construction but generally considered to have
constitutional overtones). For a contemporaneous criticism of Springer, see Note,
Power of Appointments to Public Office Under the Federal Constitution, 42 HARV.
L. REV. 426 (1928) (contending that the question whether the appointive power is
exclusively for the executive is sufficiently doubtful to counsel deference to con-
gressional judgment).
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language fully contemplate that other branches may play a significant, even
determinative, role in the selection of even executive officers. 3
With respect to the selection of Supreme Court justices, moreover, the
appointments clause explicitly gives the Senate a veto.15 4 By the literal
language of the appointments clause as it has always been understood, the
president simply has no constitutional power to make Supreme Court ap-
pointments without the consent of the Senate, which may withhold that
consent until satisfied that an appointment should be made.1 55 Any argument
that seeks to fix standards for the veto, apart from the constitutional stan-
dards the Senate respects by exercising it, degenerates quickly into the
threadbare complaint that the Senate's role is merely to rubber stamp the
president's choices. 56
A different question would arise if the Senate were to specify an affirma-
tive plan by which the president must select nominees and were to force
cooperation by refusing to approve candidates selected in any other way.15 1
Granted, such a scheme would seem, at first, to invade the executive's
113 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2621 (1988) (refusing to embrace
any wooden rule that the president or his designees enjoy absolute power to appoint
officers that perform purely executive functions). The removal of executive officers
presents its own peculiar issues. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926)
(invalidating an attempt by Congress to advise and consent with respect to the
removal of officials performing executive duties); Corwin, Tenure of Office and the
Removal Power Under the Constitution, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 394 (1927) (criticiz-
ing Myers for failing to allow Congress an authoritative role in the removal of
executive officers and thereby creating strife between the legislative and executive
branches).
'54 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (the president "shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States").
"' See supra Part I; see also Monaghan, The Conformation Process: Law or
Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1206 (1988) (explaining that the Senate is under
"no affirmative constitutional compulsion to confirm" presidential nominees).
1 6 Of course, Congress can authorize the president to appoint "inferior Officers."
But in that event the president's power flows from statute, not from article IlI.
Inasmuch as it is the Senate, apart from the full Congress, whose advice and consent
the president must seek, there is no constitutional requirement of bicameralism or
presentment. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 (1983) (noting that the "Senate
alone" enjoys "final unreviewable power to approve or to disapprove presidential
appointments").
1.5 Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania once proposed legislation establishing a
nominating commission, the members of which were to be appointed by the presi-
dent, to generate the names of candidates for both the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts. Scott, The Selection of Federal Judges: The Independent Commission
Approach, in JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 36, at 197.
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threshold authority to nominate candidates. 5 ' Yet inasmuch as the president
would retain power to employ processes above the constitutional floor and
to select from among a range of acceptable candidates, such a plan would not
substantively undercut the president's authority to select nominees. Cer-
tainly, such a scheme would be no more troubling than the "blue slip"
system, by which individual senators effectively become the nominating
authorities with respect to some lower federal court appointments.
5 9
Finally, legislatures can often reformulate the judicial selection scheme to
ensure respect for constitutional standards. An attempt by Congress to
accomplish change in the federal system would elicit some threshold con-
cern. For whatever reason, the Constitutional Convention decided to keep
the House of Representatives out of the business of choosing most federal
officers. 60 And attempts by the full Congress to assume, or to delegate,
appointive power forthrightly have been unsuccessful. 6' At the same time,
Congress has power to determine the size of the Supreme Court, to fix its
terms, and to make "exceptions" and "regulations" with respect to the
Court's appellate jurisdiction. 62 The very existence of the lower federal
courts may depend upon congressional will, and, certainly, the jurisdiction
of those courts is open to congressional adjustment of at least some sort. 163 It
's Cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 234 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(insisting that "[t]here is not a word in the Constitution which in terms authorizes
Congress to limit the President's freedom of choice in making nominations for
executive offices").
159 The Senate has long maintained the practice of permitting individual senators to
veto presidential nominees by refusing to return a form, called a "blue slip." See
Slotnick, Reforms in Judicial Selection: Will They Affect the Senate's Role?, 64
JUDICATURE 60, 63 (1980) (explaining that the blue slip procedure creates a kind of
pocket veto for home state senators).
160 The reason may have been only to assign appointive authority to a body small
enough to perform effectively. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
1 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-39 (1976) (holding that the ap-
pointment of members of the Federal Election Commission by the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House violated the appointments clause).
162 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. See generally Congressional Limits on Fed-
eral Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 893, 901 (1982) (treating Congress's
authority regarding the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction).
163 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49
(1850) (holding that Congress need not confer the fullest constitutional jurisdiction
upon inferior courts of its own creation). See generally Gunther, Congressional
Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing
Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 920 (1984) (concluding that article III allows Congress
broad discretion to distribute federal question litigation between the state and federal
courts); Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower
Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 51
(1975) (contending that congressional power over lower federal court jurisdiction is
limited by the due process clause of the fifth amendment only in certain circum-
1989]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69: 273
follows, one should think, that Congress can specify qualifications for
federal judgeships.164 Inasmuch as abstract selection standards in this field
tend necessarily to be ambiguous, Congress may find it difficult effectively to
restrain the president by the mere statement of formal requirements. Still,
the articulation of constitutional aspirations can have its beneficial effects. If
Congress can and does require that bankruptcy judgeships be filled by
candidates chosen "without regard to race, color, sex, religion, or national
origin" and possessing a "demonstrated commitment to equal justice under
law," then it seems that Congress can and should specify similar standards
for article III judges.16 1
In the case of the lower federal courts, moreover, Congress need not settle
for a selection scheme that mirrors the plan established by the appointments
clause for Supreme Court justices. A presidential nomination coupled with
senatorial advice and consent is explicitly mandated only for the selection of
what the Court has called "principal" officers, i.e., "Ambassadors," "other
public Ministers and Consuls," and "Judges of the supreme Court. 1 66
Federal judges assigned to the district and circuit courts plainly fit none of
those three categories. The possibility that they may be "other public
Ministers" is demolished by the very next subdivision of article II, accord-
ing to which the president is to "receive Ambassadors and other public
stances). But see Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article II: Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.L. REV. 205, 272 (1985) (insisting that Congress
must vest federal question jurisdiction in some federal court); Clinton, A Mandatory
View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding
of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 754 (1984) (providing historical support for a
theory of mandatory federal jurisdiction); Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-
Foreword. Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Juris-
diction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 21-22 (1981) (also arguing that
there are limits to congressional authority); Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to
Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974) (similarly claim-
ing structural constraints).
164 Cf. Note, Congressional Power Under the Appointments Clause After Buckley
v. Valeo, 75 MicH. L. REV. 627, 640-48 (1977) (contending that Congress can
establish qualifications for federal executive officers to be appointed by the presi-
dent).
165 See 28 U.S.C. § 152 (1984), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 152 (Supp. IV 1986); see
also 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982) (providing that no more than three commissioners
appointed by the president to the International Trade Commission can be members of
the same political party).
166 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,132 (1976) (stating
that "[p]rincipal officers are selected by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate"). All "Officers of the United States" whose selection is not expressly
assigned to the president with the "Advice and Consent" of the Senate are "inferior
Officers." See Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (1988) (recognizing that the
line between inferior and principal officers "is one that is far from clear" but
suggesting no further subdivisions within those constitutional categories).
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Ministers."1' 67 The conjunction of "other public Ministers" with "Ambas-
sadors" in a provision clearly contemplating representatives of foreign gov-
ernments is strong evidence that such "other public Ministers" are officers
with authority for foreign affairs.
The presidential nomination/senatorial advice-and-consent scheme may
also be employed in the selection of "all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for." 168 But as to
"such inferior Officers," the Congress may choose to establish an alterna-
tive means. Inasmuch as there is no special provision in the Constitution for
the selection of lower court judges, they would seem to be officers whose
appointments are not "herein otherwise provided for. "' 69Accordingly, they
must be "inferior Officers" who may be chosen by means other than presi-
dential nomination with senatorial advice and consent. This result is to be
expected, of course, inasmuch as the Convention, by common account,
finally reconciled disagreements over the establishment of federal courts
apart from the Supreme Court by leaving the choice to Congress. 70
At least those whose tastes in constitutional interpretation run to intricate
examinations of text should be persuaded that this process of elimination
leads to the conclusion that lower court judges are "inferior Officers." The
proviso in the appointments clause following the colon after the term "Law"
and including the phrase "such inferior Officers" must relate to the imme-
diately preceding category of officers, i.e., "other Officers of the United
States" (including lower court judges). The only alternative is to read the
proviso to relate to all four categories of officers mentioned in the preceding
sentence-'"Ambassadors, .... other public Ministers and Consuls,"
"Judges of the supreme Court," and "all other Officers of the United
States." That interpretation would conflate "principal" and "inferior" fed-
eral officers. Certainly "Judges of the supreme Court" cannot be "such
167 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
168 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
169 The "Officers of the United States" whose appointments are "herein otherwise
provided for" would seem to be the president and vice president, the members of the
House and Senate and the constitutionally prescribed officers in each, officers of the
state militia, and the members of the electoral college-all of whom are selected by
means specified elsewhere in the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (providing for
the election of the president, vice president and the members of the electoral
college); U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3 (providing for the election of representatives and
senators); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing for the election of senators); U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (reserving to the states the appointment of officers of the
state militia).
170 See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 10-11 (3d ed. 1988)
(discussing the compromise); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 285 (1970) (endorsing the compromise account).
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inferior Officers" that Congress can establish an alternative mechanism for
their appointment.' 7 '
Lower court judges, then, may be selected after the fashion of Supreme
Court justices. If, however, Congress prefers to depart from that scheme,
perhaps in furtherance of constitutional standards, the appointment of dis-
trict and circuit judges may be vested in the "President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." I lay aside the first possibility and
partake of the second only as it may be combined with the third.' 72
One way in which Congress may inject constitutional standards into the
judicial selection process is to establish an administrative agency, within an
existing department of the national government or as a new entity created for
the purpose. 173 Subject to presidential veto and the process of accommoda-
tion such a veto would inspire, Congress is free, for example, to establish a
Department of Judicial Selection, whose "Head" can be empowered to
appoint federal judges pursuant to constitutionally required procedures and
substantive criteria. In order to safeguard this "Head" from the president,
171 The Supreme Court's reasons for concluding that independent counsels ap-
pointed under the Ethics in Government Act are "inferior Officers" throw but little
light upon the issue here. See Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). To be sure,
there is little to compare between such special prosecutors and lower federal court
judges.. Where independent counsels are removable (for cause) by the attorney
general, federal judges may be removed only by impeachment. Where independent
counsels have limited duties and must adhere to Justice Department policies, federal
judges exercise a wide jurisdiction and need conform only to their own sense of
federal law-subject to review in the Supreme Court. And where independent
counsels serve for limited periods, federal judges hold office during good behavior.
Yet none of those considerations, developed ad hoc for purposes of the necessary
decision at hand, was offered as determinative of the "inferior Officer" question in
other contexts. In the end, the Court's majority plainly and deliberately withheld any
thoroughgoing definition of "inferior Officers" that would have anticipated con-
gressional action touching lower federal court judges. While the Court might yet
place lower court judges in the "principal" category if Congress were to treat them
otherwise, any such decision would have to rest on policy considerations apart from
the appointments clause-which, on the construction offered in the text, easily
admits them to the status of "inferior Officers."
172 For an argument that the appointment of lower federal court judges should be
assigned routinely to the judicial branch, see Shartel, Federal Judges-Appoint-
ment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28
MICH. L. REV. 485, 488-92 (1930).
173 The Justice Department would be the obvious choice, but in recent years that
department has come under such criticism for subordinating the health of the federal
judiciary to the sitting president's ideological whims that the Congress may prudently
prefer to begin anew with an independent entity. See generally Goldman, Reagan's
Second Term Judicial Appointments: The Battle at Midway, 70 JUDICATURE 324
(1987) (suggesting that Justice Department officials in the Reagan years focused on
candidates' "general philosophy" rather than their experience or other credentials).
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whose power the new scheme is calculated to check, his or her appointment
may be assigned to the judicial branch-to the Supreme Court, perhaps, or
the Judicial Conference of the United States, or some specially constituted
judicial body.
An arrangement of this kind would evoke counterarguments-none of
them compelling. To begin, we can immediately dispose of any contention
that the establishment of such a new department would constitute an attempt
by Congress to aggrandize itself as against the other two branches. So long
as Congress assigns appointive authority to the department head and plainly
seeks no appointive role for itself or its members, the appointments clause is
satisfied. 174 We may also dismiss a second well-worn argument: that Con-
gress's power to assign appointive authority to the president alone, the
courts, or "Heads of Departments" contemplates that inferior federal
officers can be appointed only by authorities in the branches to which they
"most appropriately" belong. Even assuming that the head of a new De-
partment of Judicial Selection would be an executive officer of some stripe,
there is very simply no constitutional impediment to interbranch appoint-
ments.1 5
More serious constitutional difficulty would be encountered, however, if
Congress were to surrender only partial authority for the appointment of the
department head to a judicial body and were to attempt to retain some role
for itself. It comes to mind, for example, that Congress might empower the
Supreme Court only to nominate candidates to head the new agency, subject
to Senate approval-effectively substituting the Court for the president in
this context. A scheme of that nature would raise an article III issue,
inasmuch as it would arguably assign to the Court a piece of business as to
which its decisions would not be final. 176 Yet the conventional understanding
that the federal courts can be asked only to make final judgments fits this
'14 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 134-35 (1976) (holding that Congress cannot
make specific appointments).
'75 The argument against interbranch appointments was apparently credited in Ex
parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 257-58 (1839) (stating in dictum that "[t]he
appointing power here designated [in art. II, § 2] ... was no doubt intended to be
exercised by the department of the government to which the officers to be appointed
most appropriately belonged"). But the Court flatly rejected it in Ex parte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371, 397 (1879):
It is no doubt usual and proper to vest the appointment of inferior officers in
that department of the government, executive or judicial, or in that particular
executive department to which the duties of such officers appertain. But there is
no absolute requirement to this effect in the Constitution; and, if there were, it
would be difficult in many cases to determine to %which department an office
properly belonged.
Accord Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2610 (1988) (recognizing that Congress
can determine whether it is "proper" to create an interbranch appointment).
76 See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792) (suggesting that judicial
decisions cannot be subject to legislative or executive revision).
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case only roughly. The underlying value at stake is the preservation of the
courts for decisions that have to be made and the avoidance of advisory
opinions. Here, it is essential that someone be nominated for a critical
federal post, wholly apart from that person's later appointment (or rejection)
by another federal authority-in this instance the Congress. At least, it is
vital to note, the judicial choice of a nominee is final and is thus distinguish-
able from the kinds of preliminary judgments, subject to executive override,
that presumably would violate article III. There is more than formalism
between a nomination that may or may not lead to an independent appoint-
ment and a finding subject to explicit rejection by an administrative
officer.177
Finally, I am afraid insurmountable constitutional impediments would lie
in Congress's path if the department head (however she or he is selected)
were given the task of nominating judicial candidates, subject to the advice
and consent of the Senate or the full Congress. Given the precedents now on
the books, it appears that Congress is unable both to assign selection author-
ity to an agency and to retain a veto. 178 Certainly I would not suggest, in line
with ill-advised currents elsewhere in federal law, that the "greater" power
to assign appointive power to a department head includes the "lesser"
power to accord such an administrative officer some intermediate role,
reserving ultimate selection authority for the Congress or one of its
bodies. 179
I hasten to make clear that I do not recommend that a Department of
Judicial Selection be established. I mean by this exercise only to point out
that the status quo can be altered to gain respect for constitutional standards.
As the possibilities I have mentioned demonstrate, there are ways in which
the legislative branch can act, or threaten to act, to ensure that the Constitu-
tion is enforced in this context. Latent powers such as these add to the rich
177 In Hayburn's Case, for example, the federal court findings regarding pension
claims were examined by the Secretary of War, who had discretion to adopt or reject
them. Id. at 413.
178 Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-59 (1983) (invalidating a "one house
legislative veto" for want of both bicameralism and presentment). For a general
review of congressional attempts to affect the executive function, see Watson,
Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L.
REV. 983 (1975).
171 See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448 (1850) (apparently holding
that Congress's "greater" power to establish lower federal courts includes the
"lesser" power to define those courts' jurisdiction); Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-70 (1982) (crediting the contention that
Congress's "greater" power to leave adjudication of "public rights" to nonjudicial
authorities includes the "lesser" power to confer jurisdiction of such claims on
legislative courts); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 131 (1976) (apparently rejecting
this reasoning in the appointments clause context).
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mix of political intrigue that, in the end, may produce a constitutionally
acceptable judicial selection scheme. 8 '
Turning to the selection of state judges, both local legislatures and the
Congress can enact legislation prescribing procedures and substantive crite-
ria. Subject to state constitutional provisions, state legislatures can alter
existing arrangements by the exercise of their police power.',, Congress
enjoys a potentially expansive authority to legislate for the enforcement of
the fourteenth amendment, wherein the constitutional standards I have
explored may find a suitable textual basis. 82 We have done with the notion
that state autonomy poses a serious, judicially enforceable barrier to con-
gressional action-even with regard to something so close to the core as the
means by which states choose the judges who interpret state law. 8 3 Indeed,
it seems plain that Congress can override state constitutional law and elimi-
nate judicial selection schemes, including popular elections, that offer in-
sufficient assurances that federal standards will be met. Moreover, legisla-
tures, at either the state or national level, can lay the groundwork for judicial
enforcement of the Constitution within the selection schemes they them-
selves devise.
180 See, e.g., Pitts & Vinson, Breaking Down Barriers to the Federal Bench:
Reshaping the Judicial Selection Process, 2 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 27, 27-28 (1985)
(proposing an "executive compact" for the purpose of increasing the number of
African Americans on the federal district bench to a level proportionate to the share
of blacks in the national population).
181 See Mechem, The Power to Appoint to Office: Its Location and Limits, 1 MICH.
L. REV. 531, 556 (1903) (explaining that state legislatures typically have substantial
leeway in creating offices and appointing officers).
182 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); see, e.g., Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (indicating that the power to enforce the Civil War
Amendments "by appropriate legislation" overrides federalism); Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 143 (1970) (holding that discretion in the manner of "enforcement"
under section five of the fourteenth amendment is left to Congress); see Cox, The
Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promo-
tion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 107 (1966) (insisting that Congress has
enormous power under this heading to enact legislation "promoting human rights").
On Congress's power to prescribe standards above the constitutional floor identified
in judicial decisions, see Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsidera-
tion of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 819 (1986).
183 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985) (upholding
the congressional commerce clause power to legislate with respect to the states);
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (approving an even more expansive
power under the fourteenth amendment).
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CONCLUSION
In an age in which constitutional theory claims a resurging share of
attention in legal scholarship, and in which the business of choosing judges
to develop that theory commands the headlines, the intersection between the
two tends to be slighted, even ignored. I have attempted in this essay to
explore the reasons for our collective reticence regarding the Constitution
and the selection of judges, to identify constitutional standards applicable to
judicial selection, and to speculate on the way in which such standards might
be given effect by executive and legislative means. I will count myself
successful if I have persuaded at least some readers that the selection of
judges can be subjected to settled restraints attending governmental action
and disabused others of the crude notion that legal standards are worthy of
attention only if they can be enforced through conventional litigation in the
courts. At all events, I mean to insist that the constitutional democracy in
which we live depends for survival upon our commitment to choosing
executive, legislative, and judicial officers in a constitutional, that is to say
democratic, fashion.
